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Abstract 
This research investigates the activities and experiences of two pressure 
groups involved in the State Homelessness Taskforce. The aim of the research 
is to critique the predominant understanding of insider and outsider pressure 
groups within the Australian literature, which is based primarily upon the 
sectional/promotional typology. The applicability of the Aberdeen 
insider/outsider model of pressure group theory within the Australian context is 
also determined. Due to methodological difficulties inherent in attempting to 
quantify the success or effectiveness of pressure groups, this research focuses 
specifically upon the strategies employed by each group in their attempt to 
influence the findings and recommendations of the Taskforce. 
A preliminary review of pressure group literature indicated that Australian works 
contained little reference to critiques of the various understandings of insider 
and outsider groups ~hat are exhibited within the British literature. The revised 
typologies that have been advanced by British authors to circumvent these 
criticisms are similarly under-explored within the Australian literature. The 
Improved insider/outsider typologies do however offer a framework for a more 
in-depth investigation into the role and influence of pressure groups in the policy 
process. In response to these initial findings, the research aims were adjusted 
to incorporate the Aberdeen model, one of the improved insider/outsider 
models, into the analysis of the pressure groups' activities. 
A case study approach was utilised to enable the exploration of the activities 
and experiences of two of the groups involved in the Taskforce process. The 
2 
pressure groups studied in this research are the Western Australian Council of 
Socia: Service (WACOSS), the peak body for the community services sector in 
Western Australia, and the Tenants Advice Service of Western Australia 
(TASWA), a community legal centre dealing with tenancy matters. These two 
organisations were chosen as case study subjects as preliminary research 
indicated that the activities and experiences of these groups during the State 
Homelessness Taskforce would enab!o a thorough critique of the 
insider/outsider models of pressure group theory. 
Analysis of the case study data, and of the literature, enabled the existing 
understanding of insider and outsider groups in the Australian literature to be 
compared and contrasted with the Aberdeen model. Findings from this analysis 
indicate that the existing model is ineffective in categor~sing pressure groups in 
a meaningful way. The understanding of insider and outsider pressure groups 
in Australia would therefore benefit from a greater awareness, and wider 
application of, the improved insider/outsider typologies that have emanated 
from Britain. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
In the late 1970s, Sir Charles Court, the Western Australian Premier, stated that 
'democracy won't last unless elected governments govern and look to the ballot 
box, and not the pressure groups' ("Premier', 1979). Decision-making 
processes have however changed cr~nsiderably since this time, Rnd 
government consultation with pressure groups is now more routine than during 
Sir Charles' premiership. Importantly, input from pressure groups is often 
considered vital to the development of relevant and meaningful public policy, as 
the groups provide knowledge and expertise not always held by politicians ond 
bureaucrats. Consequently, comprehension of the role and influence of 
pressure groups is integral to the study of Australian politics. 
Pressure groups, also comrnonly referred to as interest groups, are non-party 
associations or organisations that are independent from government, and which 
aim to inform and influence the way in which public policy is devised and 
implemented (Abbott, 1996, p.1 0; Henderson, 1989, p.180-181; Matthews, 
1989, p.211; Singleton, Aitkin, Jinks, & Warhurst, 2003, p.341; Solomon, 1988, 
p.153; Willmott & Dowse, 2000, p.159). Estimates of the number of pressure 
groups in Australia vary from 3750 (ABS, 1997) to 7000 (Marsh, 1995). These 
groups span the policy spectrum and attempt to influence decisions in a broad 
range of areas including business, labour relations, health, agriculture, welfare 
and the environment (Abbott, 1996, p.13; Marsh, 1995, p.56; Matthews, 1989, 
p.211 ). 
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Despite the proliferation of pressure groups, debate continues as to whether 
they enhance or detract from the quality of Australia's democracy. Supporters 
of pressure group activity assert that the grou~ s improve participatory 
democracy by enabling more citizens to become involved in the political 
process which has become far removed from individual invol·,ement. Pressure 
groups also inform government of the viewpoints of their members, and offer 
specialist knowledge (Abbott, 1996, p.xix; Beresford, 2000, p.126; Howlett & 
Ramesh, 1995, p.57; Singleton et al., 2003, pp.341 ,345; Solomon, 1988, 
p.153). It is also asserted that pressure groups promote stability. Abbott (1996, 
p.xix) remarks: 
pressure groups act as mechanisms through which peaceful polit!cal 
discussion and action can take place, and in doing so are an 
important mechanism that helps to promote social cohesion and 
popular acceptance of political decisions that govern society. 
Critics of pressure group activity argue that the groups' role in the political 
process brings a range of problems. Of primary concern is that some pressure 
groups are mare powerful and influential than others. Government may heed to 
the wishes of economically or culturally powerful groups, or to those with large 
memberships, at the expense of wider consensus and/or good public policy 
(Abbott, 1996, p.xviii; Beresford, 2000, p.126; Solomon, 1988, p.1o4). 
Other concerns include the suggestion that pressure groups are self-interested 
and not motivated by the national interest. Moreover, the influence that 
pressure groups assert can be unaccountable because agreements and policy 
decisions may be made behind closed doors and outside the formal deci£.ion-
making process (Abbott, 1996, p.xviii). Additionally, policy stagnation may 
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occur whem two equally prominent groups are in opposition on an issue, 
paralysing government decision-making (Beresford, 2000, p.128). 
An improved appreciation of the role and influence of pressure groups in policy 
development and implementation is therefore vital to a greater understanding of 
the operation of political and decisioii--making processes. In order to better 
comprehend this role, various British authors have attempted to categorise 
pressure groups. Beer (1956, cited in Baggott, 1995, > .13) divided pressure 
groups into four categories: producer groups; welfare state client groups; 
welfare state provider groups; and professional groups and organisations. A 
second and more influential classification model was put forth by Stewart (1958, 
cited in Grant, 2000, p.18), who divided groups into sectional and promotional 
categories: sectional groups work in the best interests of their members, whilst 
promotional groups advance causes for the good of society (Baggott, 1995, 
pp.13-14; Grant, 2000, pp.18-19). 
A third classification model, the insider/outsider typology, emerged in ihe 1970s 
in the work of Grant (1978, cited in Baggott, 1995, p.18; and in Grant, 2000, 
p.19), from the University of Warwick. This model has since been critiqued and 
revised by Maloney, Jordan and Mclaughlin (1994), collectively known as the 
Aberdeen group due to Maloney and Jordan's association with the University of 
Aberdeen. This model describes groups as either 'insiders' or 'outsiders', with 
their status reflecting the group's choice of tactics and level of influence upon 
decision-makers. Due to the compelling contributions of the Aberdeen model to 
the understanding of pressure groups in Britain, it is the theoretical model upon 
which this research is based. 
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This research utilises a case study approach to investigate the attempts of two 
pressure groups to influence the Western Australian State Homelessness 
Taskforce. The pressure groups studied were the Western Australian Council 
of Social Service (WACOSS), and the Tenants Advice Service of Western 
Australia (TASWA). WACOSS is the peak community services body in Western 
Australia, and has played an increased role in the policy process since the 
election of the Gallop Labor Government. It was selected as a representative 
example of an insider group, TASWA is a community legal centre specialising in 
tenancy issues and the rights of tenants. It was selected due to its controversial 
actions surrounding the Taskforce, including the resignation of its Co-ordinator 
from the Taskforce, and the fonmation of an alternative taskforce on 
homelessness, both of which strongly suggested outsider status. 
Although several case studies of pressure groups have been conducted in 
Australia, few studies at either the state or federal level have investigated the 
insider/outsider model of pressure group theory in detail.1 The case stud!es 
conducted for this research aime~ ~o determine: 
• the activities and experiences of two pressure groups during the Western 
Australian State Homelessness Taskforce; 
• what the groups' activities and experiences revealed about the on-going 
relevance of the insider/outsider model represented in the Australian 
literature; and 
• the applicability of the Aberdeen model in the Australian context. 
1 For examples of other case studies conducted at the federal level see Abbott 
(1996), and a1 the state level see Halpin (2002), Power (1996) and Scott (1980). 
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The studies of WACOSS and TASWA were conducted in accordance with case 
study m6lhod protocols as prescribed by Yin (1994, p.49), and focused primarily 
on the analys1~ of documentary evidence. ln-de~ih interviews with a key 
infonmant from each organisation (Appendix 1 ), and a survey (Appendices 2 & 
3), based upon the one conducted by Abbott (1996), supplemented the 
documentary evidence.2 
Limitations of the case study method are well recognised, and precau\lons were 
taken to address the issues raised within the literature. It may be difficult to 
ascertain an accurate picture of a pressure group's operations solely from 
documentation for several reasons: the group may not have filed all 
correspondence; relevant information may have been filed incorrectly, or in files 
that the researcher is unaware of; or the group may deliberately choose to limit 
the researcher's access to documentation, without the knowledge of the 
researcher (Yin, 1994, p.BO). 
Key informant interviews and a survey ware therefore used to broaden the 
sources of the information collected. However, these research tools may have 
their own set of limitations. The infonmation gathered in interviews may be 
biased depending on the questions asked, or whether or not the interviewee is 
completely truthful in their responses (Yin, 1994, p.80). Further, the survey may 
be answered differently, depending upon which person from the organisation 
completes it. 
2 Leanne Barron, a former employee of WACOS'd who was the Soc!al Policy Manager 
at the time of the Taskforce, was interviewed about WACOSS' activities and 
experiences. The key TASWA informant interviewed was Dr Jeannine Purdy. Purdy Is 
no longer employed by TASWA, but was its Co-ordinator during the Taskforce. The 
current Executive Officers of both organisations gave their consent for the 
documentation relating to the groups' activities during the Taskforce to be accessed, 
and for the involvement of their current and former staff members (Appendix 5). 
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To strengthen the research, several strategies, as detailed within the case 
method, were implemented. To ensure that the groups had not been 
misrepresented due to gaps in the documentary evidence, or to 
misinterpretation of data, the key informants and organisational representatives 
read and commented upon the analysis of their relevant group's activities. The 
project supervisor also commented on the plausibility of the research findings.3 
Additionally, the validity of the research was improved via the anol)•sis of 
multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1994, p.33). Documentation from the groups, 
key informant interviews, survey data, Taskforce documentation and newspaper 
clippings were used in the study. 
Yin (1994, p.33) and Gillham (2000, pp.20,23) also suggest that a case study 
database be created to increase the reliability of the research. Subsequently, a 
database for this research (Appendix 4), consisting of a collection of data, 
evidence and notes, was created. The collection is indexed to allow for the 
easy retrieval of documents. A chain of evidence is also maintained within the 
thesis bibliography in which the individual references are directly linked to the 
relevant document within the database. 
This thesis is divided ;.nto seven chapters, including this introduction. In 
Chapter 2, the current unders~andings of insider and outsider pressure groups 
aro discussed in detail. Chapter 3 offers an overview of the State 
Homelessness Taskforce, including nsasons for its formation and it::. key 
findings and recommendations, and Chapter 4 provides a synopsis of WACOSS 
and TASWA. Chapter 5 details the sl'rategies used by thG groups in their 
'Gillham (2000, p.32) and Yin (1994, p.33) su1 gest that these steps be undertaken. 
13 
attempts to influence the Taskforce, and Chapter 6 explores the factors 
underlying the strategic choices made by the two organisations. In conclusion, 
Chapter 7 provides a discussion of the effectiveness of the existing 
understanding of insider and outsider pressure groups in the Australian 
literature, and the applicability of the Aberdeen insider/outsider model in the 
Australian context. 
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Chapter 2 -The Insider/Outsider Model of Pressure 
Group Theory 
The role and influence of pressure groups within the policy process has 
emerged as an important area of political science research. Recognition of the 
impact of pressure groups upon policy and decision-making processes has 
resulted in lhe analysis of groups, and the subsequent development of several 
systems of categorisation that aim to provide clarity about pressure group 
activity. This chapter examines in detail one of these categorisations: the 
insider/outsider model of pressure group theory. 
Australian understandings of the operation and influence of pressure groups are 
based primarily upon theory developed within the British literature. While Beer's 
classification model is sometimes referred to (for e.g. Beresford, 2000, pp.120-
124; Marsh, 1995, pp.57-71), the sectional/promotional typology is the most 
prevalent model in use (for e.g. Henderson, 1989, p.184; Jaensch, 1997, 
pp.172-173; Kingsley & Farnsworth, 1993; Matthews, 1989, pp.211-212; 
Singleton et al., 2003, pp.342-350; Willmott & Dowse, 2000, pp.156-159). 
However, the Australian literature does not refer to an insider/outsider model 
per se. Rather, basic notions of insider and outsider groups have tended to be 
integrated into the sectional/promotional typology: thai is, sectional groups are 
likely to be insiders and promotional groups are likely to be outsiders (Singleton 
et al., 2003. pp.342-350; Willmott & Dowse, 2000, pp.159-160). For the 
purposes of this thesis, this basic understanding of insider and outsider 
pressure groups will be referred to as the 'existing model'. 
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Under the existing model, groups are classified as insiders if they have access 
to decision-makers; are consulted by government; are seen to be influential; 
and if they use 'appropriate' tactics to achieve their goals. These groups tend to 
be important either economically or culturally, with groups who represent 
economic interests being particularly powerful (Abbott, 1996, p.xi; Henderson, 
1989, p.196; Jaensch, 1994, p.180; Matthews, 1989, pp.212,216; Singleton et 
al., 2003, p.350; Willmott & Dowse, 2000, p.162). Moreover, insider groups 
tend to share the ideological and political beliefs of government (Beresford, 
2000, p.119). 
Further, the existing model stipulates that insider groups tend to have significant 
economic and human resources; a large membership base; an organised 
administration; and an advanced level of understanding of the processes of 
government and decision-making. They also provide policy solutions as well as 
critiques; are united on aims and strategies to achieve those aims; have expert 
knowledge; and produce well-researched inforn1ation and advice (Abbott, 1996, 
p.21; Jaensch, 1994, p.178; Matthews, 1989, p.216; Willmott & Dowse, 2000, 
p.165). 
In addition, the existing model defines insider groups as those which attempt to 
influence decisions via interaction with consultation processes. Activities of 
pressiJre groups which involve them in consultation processes include research-
based submissions; representation on government advisory boards and 
committees; participation with a policy network; and lobbying ministers and their 
advisors. Insider groups may also provide bureaucrats with information upon 
request, and have formal and/or informal meetings with ministers and their 
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advisors (Henderson, 1989, pp.189-192; Singleton et al., 2003, p.344; Willmott 
& Dowse, 2000, p.162). Matthews (1989, p.218) notes that these activities 
further reinforce a group's position as an insider, as they improve their contacts 
and strengthen their position as a responsible group. 
Conversely, under the existing model outsider groups do not have direct links to 
decision-makers, either because they choose not to, or because they are not 
seen to be legitimate. Outsider groups also find it difficult to exert influence, 
and are perceived to employ inappropriate tactics and be at ideological odds 
with government (Beresford, 2000, pp.119-120; Jaensch, 1994, p.181; 
Matthews, 1989, p.212; Singleton et al., 2003, p.350). In addition, outsider 
groups tend to have limited control over the actions of their memberships, and 
exisi outside of the policy network (Abbott, 1996, p.26; Singleton et al., 2003, 
p.1i51 ). 
Examples of tactics used by outsider groups include: public protests; 
letter/fax/email campaigns; use of talk-back radio; letters to the editor; boycotts; 
strike action; litigation; and publicity stunts (Henderson, 1989, p.185-189; 
Matthews, 1989, p.215; Singleton et al., 2003, p.344; Willmott & Dowse, 2000, 
p.163). Singleton (2003, p.355) notes that outsider groups tend to have minimal 
resources, and subsequently rely heavily upon media attention as it is difficult 
for government to ignore .1:bsues once they are discussed heatedly within the 
public domain. 
However, this understanding of insiders and outsiders remains a very 
generalised account of the role of pressure groups in the policy process, and is 
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unable to account adequately for the diverse roles and influence of pressure 
groups (Baggott, 1995, pp.15-17). More complex and insightful models have 
therefore been developed, which focus exclusively on the insider/outsider 
dichotomy. Several British authors, including Grant, and Maloney et al. have 
developed these models. 
Grant (1978 & 1989, cited in Baggott, 1995, p.18; and in Maloney et al., 1994, 
pp.27-28) recognised the inadequacies of other pressure group typologies and 
created a model that aimed to offer greater clarity by dividing pressure groups 
into insiders and outsiders. Insider groups were further divided into three sub-
categories: 'high profile' groups that use the media to raise public support on an 
issue; 'low profile' groups that use the more 'acceptable' channels of influence; 
and 'prisoner groups', whose activities are curtailed due to their dependence 
upon government funding and/or support. Outsider groups were also divided 
into three sub-groups: those who may become insiders providing they use 
acceptable strategies; those who are outsiders due to fhe lack of skills and 
expertise required to be an insider; and groups who are outsiders based upon 
their ideology. 
Grant's work was influential, and has made significant in-roads into an improved 
understanding of pressure groups. Nonetheless, his model has attracted 
criticism. Some authors dispute the inference that only insider groups will be 
effective, and that all groups will aim to achieve insider status (Baggott, 1995, 
p.19; Maloney et al., 1994, pp.32,38). 
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A thorough critique of Grant's model has been offered by Maloney et al. They 
buili upon the work of Grant and other authors, and developed an even mme 
comprehensive illsider/outsider model. Grant (2000, p.29) has since remarked 
that the former understandings of insiders and outsiders "might usefully be 
replaced by that offered by the Aberdeen group". Maloney et al. recognise that 
pressure groups may use an array of strategies; that the types of strategies 
employed are not necessarily dictated by the insider or outsider status of the 
group; and that there are varying levels of access and influence amongst insider 
groups. The Aberdeen group's rewor•ed model offers the greatest insights into 
the insider/outsider typology, and has therefore been selected as the basis for 
classification of the pressure groups investigated ir. this study. 
The Aberdeen group's main criticism of Grant's model, and of the other 
understandings of insiders and outsiders, is that they fail to separate strategy 
from status. Strategies are the tactics employed by pressure groups in their 
attempts to influence the policy process, and Maloney et al. (1994, p.28) 
emphasise that "strategy is a matter selected by the group". Conversely, the 
status of a pressure group is determined by the decision-makers it attempts to 
influence, and reflects the level of legitimacy of the group amongst decision-
makers (Maloney et al., 1994, p.30). Maloney et al. note that "the status 
position is conditional upon government granted legitimacy: it is ascribed by 
policymakers to the group" (1994, p.28). The distinction between strategy and 
status is integral to an improved understanding of pressure groups, and is 
required to reduce the analytical confusion created by other models (Maloney et 
al., 1994, p.29). 
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The Aberdeen group therefore separates strategy and status in their 
classification model. Further, they argue that any group with access to the 
consultation process has insider status. They believe that access is not difficult 
to achieve, and consequently there are many more insider groups than other 
insider/outsider models suggest (Maloney et al., 1994, p.19).4 Hence, they 
divide insider status into sub-categories. This reflects the reality that some 
groups have minimal levels of access, whilst others enjoy a more advantaged 
position of access and influence (Maloney et al., 1994, p.25). Page's comments 
(cited in Grant, 2000, p.30) indicate how important this distinction is: 
to characterise a group as an 'insider' or an 'outsider' in the process 
of making policy is at best an oversimplification and at worst possibly 
misleading .... the apparent dichotomy implicit in the whole notion of 
an 'insider' is a false one; there is rather a graduation of access to 
executive decision making. 
The Aberdeen group also assert that there is a gi·eater divergence amongst 
insiders than between insiders and outsiders (Maloney et al., 1994, p.37). 
In contrast to the assumptions inherent in the former understandings of insider 
and outsider groups, Maloney et al. argue that consultation occurs with a wide 
range of groups regardless of which party is in government. This occurs as a 
variety of perspectives require consideration if good public policy is to be 
formulated (Maloney et al., 1994, pp.19-23,27). Of course the input from some 
groups will have more weight and be considered in greater detail than others, 
but nonetheless almost any group can be involved in the consultation process 
(Maloney et al., 1994, p.27). The Aberdeen group therefore postulates that 
ideology is less important in defining whether a group is ascribed insider or 
outsider status than the existing model suggests. 
4 Page (cited in Grant, 2000, pp.24,27) also makes these points. 
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Importantly, the Aberdeen model is based upon the 'quality of access' that 
groups have to decision-makers, rather than how successful or effective they 
may have been (Maloney et al., 1994, p.26). This distinction is made as it is 
methodologically difficult to determine the effectiveness of individual groups 
(Grant, 2000, p.193; Henderson, 1989, p.195; Maloney et al., 1994, p.26). 
Rather, Maloney et al. use the term 'influence', and define it as the significance 
of a group's input into the policy process. Groups can therefore be classified as 
'influential', even if they have not achieved their stated aims (Maloney et al., 
1994, p.26). 
The four sub-categories of insider status articulated by the Aberdeen group are 
core, specialist, peripheral, and failed insiders. These levels of insider status 
are based upon the quality of access that groups possess and their level of 
influence. Groups who are willing to 'consult', negotiate' and 'bargain' with 
decision-makers, and whose aims can be achieved via gradual shifts in policy, 
qualify for some level of insider status, although few actually have significant 
influence (Maloney et al., 1994, p.36). 
Core insiders are the most respected and influential of groups. They have 
secured a position that enables an ongoing role in policy development and 
decision-making across whole areas of policy. However, they are only likely to 
be significantly influential within their recognised area(s) of expertise (Maloney 
et al., 1994, pp.30-32). 
Decision-makers also hold specialist insider groups in high esteem, and these 
groups are involved in the highest levels of consultation with government. 
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However, they have a narrower policy focus than core groups, and 
consequently their involvement in the policy process is more intermittent 
(Maloney et al., 1994, pp.30,32). The commonality between core and specialist 
groups is :hat in addition to aocess to the consultation process, both types of 
groups are in the position to bargain and negotiate with decision-makers 
(Maloney et al., 1994, p.25). 
At the third level of insider status are peripheral insider groups. These groups 
are perceived by decision-makers to be legitimate, and they participate wi~~in 
the insider realm, however they are not groups that policy-makers actively seek 
to consult. These groups tend to have a minimal overall level of impact upon 
policy decisions, although they can, at times, be influential (Maloney et al., 
1994, pp.31-32). 
The fourth level of insider status contains the failed insiders. Groups who fall 
within this category are the least effectual insiders. They are recognised by 
decision-makers, and adhere to the rules of insider politics, but their activities 
are essentially superficial in nature and have virtually no impact upon policy 
(Maloney et al., 1994, p.32). 
Groups not involved in the insider realm are defined as having an outsider 
status. Maloney et al. divide outsider status groups into two sub-categories: 
outsider status by ideology or goal; and outsider status by choice. Groups 
within the first category do not believe they can be influential within the insider 
realm, as their aims are not focused upon conventional approaches that seek 
gradual changes in policy. Their aims, habitually in conflict with government 
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positions, result in the groups resorting to outsider strategies in the hope of 
having their opinions aired (Maloney et al., 1994, p.32). As such, they are at 
odds with the insider process both ideologically and methodologically. Ma!oney 
et al. argue that it is the r1pe of strategies these groups employ, rather than 
their beliefs, which result in their exclusion from the consultation process 
(Maloney et al., 1994, p.37). 
Groups within the second category choose to have an outsider status. The very 
existence of these groups is dependant upon the support and involvement of 
their members. Supporters are in turn attracted to these groups by the 
uncompromising stance that the gro•Jps assume. These outsiders therefore 
cannot afford to utili'.se insider methods even if ttleir issue can be more readily 
addressed that way. Consequently, their chances of influencing policy are often 
minimal (Maloney et al., 1994, p.32). However, the Aberdeen group (1994, 
p.38) dispute the assertion within the wider pressure group literature that 
outsiders never play a role in the development or amendment of policy: 
outsiders can, they believe, at times be influential. 
Maloney et al. assert that the value to decision-makers of the resources of a 
particular group will ultimately determine the level of access and influence that 
the group attains (Halpin, 2002, p.490; Maloney et al., 1994, p.36). The 
resources a group has to offer may lead to an 'exchange-based' relationship 
with government: 
government offers groups the opportunity to shape public policy, 
while groups provide government with certain resources (eg. 
knowledge, technical advice or expertise, membership compliance 
or consent, credibility, information, implementation guarantees) 
which it needs to secure a workable policy. (Maloney et al., 1994, 
p.36) 
23 
Maloney et al., of the Aberdeen group, (1994, pp.29-30) note that while the 
strategies used by a group are important, it is the resources of a group that 
govern its status. They doubt lhat 'resource rich' groups would be ignored even 
if they have acted outside accepted guidelines in the past. Group resources 
therefore play a significant role in determining status, particularly when groups 
are competing wilh each other for influence. 
Resources include economic position; expertise; level of understanding of 
government and the decision-making processes; membership base; strength 
and level of organisation of a group's administration; and the degree to which 
the membership is united and supports the administration and its decisions 
(Maloney et al., 1994, p.23). Other authors similarly emphasise the importance 
of resources for groups seeking to have significant influence upon the policy 
process (for e.g. Abbott, 1996, p.21; Grant, 2000, pp.195-196; Henderson, 
1989, p.195; Howlett & Ramesh, 1995, p.57; Jaensch, 1994, p.178; 1997, 
p.350; Matthews, 1989, p.216; Willmott & Dowse, 2000, p.165). The wider 
pressure group literature suggests that economically powerful groups are the 
most influential. However, in some instances, less well-financed groups may 
also be effective. Maloney et al (1994, p.21) note that "the development of 
(some) technical expertise, or political sophistication, may give them credibility 
with decision makers". 
The Aberdeen model also divides pressure group strategies into insider and 
outsider categories. Insider strategies are the tactics used by pressure groups 
that fall within the realm of activities that are deemed to be 'acceptable' and 
'legitimate' by decision-makers (Maloney et al., 1994, p.29). These tactics 
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involve consultation, bargaining and negotiation (Maloney et al., 1994, p.25). 
Dunleavy describes these activities as 'low cost actions' (cited in Maloney et al., 
1994, p.26). Groups who use both insider strategies, and achieve · 'Sider 
status, are more likely to accomplisi"J thP;r desired outcomes than other groups 
(Jordan & Maloney, 1997, p.2; Maloney et al., 1994, p.29). 
Outsider strategies are referred to as 'high cost actions' (Dunleavy, cited in 
Maloney et al., 1994, p.26), and are usually touted by decision-makers as 
'inappropriate' behaviour. These activities are frequently focused on 'showing 
up' the government, often take a confrontational approach, and are usually 
employed with the objective of gaining maximum media coverage and public 
attention. Wilson (1990, pp.92-93) comments that "in large part, such choices 
reflect a realistic assessment of the improbability of achieving the group's 
objectives through dialogue with ministers and civil seiVants". Groups may 
also need to employ outsider strategies in order to recruit, inspire and maintain 
members (Jordan & Halpin, 2003, p.314; Maloney et al., 1994, pp.34-35). 
Additionally, the Aberdeen model recognises that pressure groups exist wilich 
alternate between insider and outsider strategies, or which use a combination of 
both types of strategies (May and Nugent, cited in Baggott, 1995, p.20; and in 
Maloney et al., 1994, p.28). Jaensch (1994, p.180) comments that the ability to 
change strategies and tactics may underpin the success and durability of a 
group. Page (cited in Grant, 2000, p.30; and in Jordan & Halpin, 2003, p.318) 
asserts that, providing there is no encouragement of violent forms of protest, the 
use of an amalgam of strategies will not affect insider status: 
Government departments know and understand the aspirations of 
and constraints operating on group leaders and expect groups to 
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make a loud noise on some things, and they will still invita them to 
participate in working groups and other participatory forums. 
Maloney et al. (1994, pp.34-35) contend that organisations often do not have a 
choice in the types of strategies the)• pursue, even though the standard 
pressure group literature implies otherwise. They note that the type of policy 
change a grr . JSpires to achieve will ultimately dictate the strategies it uses. 
For example, groups that aim to achie'e incremental policy change will 
generally employ insider strategies. Groups that aim to achieve more radical 
policy change often attempt to do so via outsider methods. Other factors that 
determine the strategies an organisation employs include its history, the 
expectations of its members, and its funding sources. 
Therefore, the Aberdeen model classifies pressure groups according to both 
their status and the strategies they employ. There are four categories of insider 
status group and two categories of outsider status group. The level of access a 
group achieves is ultimately dependant upon the resources the group has to 
offer government, allhough the strategies employed by a group may also affect 
its status. Strategies can similarly be divided into insider and outsider 
categories, and groups are constrained in their choice of strategy due to a 
variety of factors. A brief comparison of the key features of the existing model 
and the Aberdeen model is offered in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Com~arison of tl1e Ke~ Features of the Existing Model and the 
Aberdeen Model 
Categories Importance Influence Types of 
of ideology strategies 
used 
Existing Groups are Ideology Only Insider 
model divided into and group insiders are groups use 
insider and resources influential. insider 
outsider impact upon strategies 
categories. a group's and outsider 
influence. groups use 
The status outsider 
of groups strategies. 
and the 
types of Groups are 
strategies free to 
they use are 'choose' 
inextricably ~"3pecific 
linked. &~rategies 
(i.e. media 
releases, 
lobbying, 
boycotts). 
Aberdeen Groups are Ideology is Groups with Insider 
mCidel divided into not as insider status 
four types of relevant. status are groups are 
insider Group most lil<ely not limited 
status, and resources to be to insider 
two types of are a more influential, strategies, 
outsider important but outsider and outsider 
status. detenminant status status 
of influence. groups can groups are 
Strategies also have not limited 
are also influence. to outsider 
divided into strate9ies. 
insider and 
outsider Groups are 
categories. cvnstrained 
in their 
choice of 
strategy by 
their aims, 
history, 
members, 
and funding 
sources. 
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The underlying assertion of the Aberdeen model is lhat Britain is a 'post-
parliamentary democracy', in which policy communities, comprised of senior 
bureaucrats, pressure groups and other individuals and groups with expertise, 
negotiate and often formulate policy (Richardson and Jordan, 1979, cited in 
Laffin, 1989, p.39). In this scenario, almost any group can be involved ir. the 
consultation process providing they show a 'serious interest' (Maloney et al., 
1994, p.27), and ideological positions will not play a major role in whether the 
group is influential (Maloney et al., 1994, pp.22-23). 
This requires further contemplation if the Aberdeen model is to be applied within 
the Aus'!falian setting, where, it is argued, political party ideology does impact 
upon the status of pressure groups. Matthews and Warhurst (1993, p.95) argue 
that in Australia, strong parties rule the roost at both state and federal levels, 
and a change in government increases access and influence to some groups, 
whilst minimising the role of previously privileged groups. They remark: 
it is a safe prediction that party politics will continue to influence not 
only the strategies of many groups but also their access to 
government and their chances of success in the policy-making 
processes at both the Commonwealth and State levels in Australia. 
Alternatively, Laffin (1989, p.39) contends that the Australian situation is very 
similar to that which exists in Britain. He argues that the degree of separation 
between the ideologies of the two major parties has decreased significantly. He 
also states that even if there appears to be policy differences during an election 
campafgn, once in government, the former opposition experiences inte11 1 
pressure to maintain the status quo, often resulting in the alteration of policy 
·ositions. Further, he agrees with Richardson and Jordan's assertion (cited in 
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Laffin, 1989, p.39), that due to the existence of policy communities, changes in 
government do not overly impact upon pressure group access and policy 
stability. 
This debate does not overly impact upon the applicability of the Aberdeen 
model in the Australian context. However, the role of ideology in the ascription 
of status will need to be considered by those who use the Aberdeen model to 
de-con~truct pressure group activity in Australia. Nonetheless, there will be 
groups who are included and others who are not in both environments. This is 
the fundamental similarity between the British and Australian systems that 
underlies the applicability of the Aberdeen model to the Australian setting. 
The Australian pressure group literature pays credence to the traditional 
pressure group classification models but affords little investigation into the more 
contemporary insider/outsider models. The Aberdeen model is directly 
applicable to the Australian setting, and offers a framework for an in-depth 
investigation into the role and influence of pressure groups in the policy 
process. Both the existing model in Australia, and the Aberdeen model, will be 
applied to the case studies and critiqued in detail in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of why the State Homelessness Taskforce was 
formed, and its findings and recommendations. 
29 
Chapter 3 - The State Homelessness Taskforce 
The State Homelessness Taskforce was formed in July 2001 by the Western 
Australian Government as a joint project between the Department for 
Community Development and the Department for Housing and Works. This 
chapter explores several key developments that put homelessness on the policy 
agenda and resulted in the establishment of the Taskforce. These 
developments included the increase in research on the extent of homelessness 
in Australia and Western Australia; the formulation of homelessness strategies 
by the Howard Federal Government and other State Governments; and 
incessant lobbying by agencies and representative bodies within the community 
welfare sector. 
The academic literature reports a steady increase in the incidence of 
homelessness in Australia since the late 1970s. This increase is attributable to 
a combination of a wide variety of structural and individual causes. Structural 
causes include poverty; unemployment; low income levels; inadequate services; 
and the lack of affordable, secure and appropriate housing (ACOSS, 2001; 
AFHO, 2001; AIHW, 2001, p.322; T. Burke, 1994, p.7; Neil & Fopp, 1994, 
pp.38-47,170-177; Raper, 2000). Individual causes include poor physical 
and/or mental health; intellectual disability; drug and alcohol abuse; family and 
relationship breakdown; gambling problems; domestic violence; and physical 
and sexual abuse (AIHW, 2001, p.322; Leech, 2001; Raper, 2000). 
Data collected in the 1996 Australian Bureau of Statistics census indicated that 
the rate of homelessness in Western Australia was comparatively higher than in 
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its eastern counterparts. It was reported that there were 12,252 homeless 
people in Western Australia on census night, which is 71.5 per 10,000 head of 
population. In comparison, in New South Wales there were 49.4 homeless 
people per 10,000 and 41.0 par 10,000 in Victoria (Chamberlain, 1999, pp.43-
44). 
In the lead up to the establishment of the Taskforce, reports from welfare 
agencies in Western Australia indicated that there were growing numbers of 
people in crisis. In March 2001, the Salvation Army in Perth noted an increase 
in the number of people with mental illness seeking assistance, and the difficulty 
in finding long-term accommodation in either public housing or the !)rivate 
market for people who had been in crisis care. Also at this time Mission 
Australia's regional manager claimed that up to 80% of young people who 
sought accommodation assistance could not be helped (Miller, 2001, p.4). In 
November 2001 WACOSS released its Australians Living on the Edge 2000/01 
report, which concluded there was an increase from the previous year in the 
number of people seeking assistance, and in those who went unassisted. This 
was attributed to the sheer demand for services, the increase in the number of 
people with complex needs, and the lack of resources across the sector 
(James, 2001, p.29). 
The high proportion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people who were 
homeless in Western Australian was also cause for alarm. Even though 
Indigenous people comprise only 3.1% of Western Australia's population, they 
represented approximately half of the homeless people (Chamberlain, 1999, 
pp.22,4D; Crevatin & Pendergast, 2002, pp.7-8), and 18% of public housing 
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tenants (SHTF, 2001 a, p.2). TASWA estimates that in 2001 there were more 
than 1000 homeless Indigenous families in Western Australia, and Ted Wilkes, 
a former Director of the Derbarl Yerrigan Health Service, commented "every 
Aboriginal tamily I know has told me of experiences of having homeless family 
members sleeping on lounge floors .. ." (Boase, 2001, p.3). 
Features of Indigenous homelessness include removal from family and country; 
housing in which personal safety is compromised; and the absence of any form 
of shelter (AFHO, 2000; Lai & McDonald, 2001, p.3). Issues that contribute to 
the high proportion of homeless Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
include low incomes; overcrowding; high rates of unemployment; and the 
misunderstanding of rules and regulations applicable to public housing which 
may result in eviction (Berry, MacKenzie, Briskman, & Ngwenya, 2001, pp.11-
14; Neil & Fopp, 1994, p.99). Alleged discrimination within the public housing 
system and the private rental market is also charged with directly contributing to 
the high rate of Indigenous homelessness (O'Brien, 2001, p.5; WACOSS, 
2001 a, p.6). 
The prevalence of literature on the nature and extent of homelessness at both 
national and state levels provided the basis upon which pressure could be 
exerted on governments to develop policies and programs to prevent and 
ameliorate homelessness. Additional precursors to the formation of the State 
Homelessness Tflskforce in Western Australia were the establishment of the 
National Homelessness Strategy by the Federal Government in May 2000; the 
launch of the Victorian Homelessness Strategy in July 2000; and the 
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homelessness strategy implemented in inner Sydney in 2001 (SHTF, 2002, 
pp.23-24). 
Also integral to the establishment of the Taskforce was the pre- and post-
election lobbying by community welfare pressure groups including WACOSS, 
Shelter WA and the Community Housing Coalition of Western Australia (SHTF, 
2001 b, p. 7). Prior to the announcement that an election was pending, 
homelessness was not on the policy agenda. In the Taskforce's Final Report, it 
was stated that through intensive lobbying, the community welfare sector 
managed to convince the major parties that homelessness was a significant 
social problem that required immediate government action, and subsequently 
the issue shifted onto the policy agenda during the 2000/01 election campaign 
(SHTF, 2002, p.25). 
The State Homelessness Taskforce was fanned as a result of the Labor Party's 
pre-election promise, and the continued pressure placed upon the newly 
elected Gallop Labor Government by interested parties. Its first meeting was 
conducted in late July 2001 (SHTF, 2001 c). Initially, the Taskforce was 
comprised of 13 members, although this was reduced to 12 due to the 
resignation of one of the members. Selection of Taskforce members was based 
upon their experience in, and knowledge of, homelessness issues (SHTF, 
2001a, p.3). The Taskforce's oanel included people from community 
organisations; government departments; the Aboriginal community; and a 
representative from outside the metropolitan area. The Taskforce also had a 
secretariat that consisted of a staff member from the Department for Housing 
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and Works, and from the Department for Community Development, and a non-
government employee (SHTF, 2001a, p.3). 
The terms of reference for the Taskforce included the development of a holistic 
approach to addressing homelessness in Western Australia, via wide 
consu~ation with the community and relevant government departments. In 
particular, the Taskforce was developed to devise a plan that addressed the key 
issues underlying homelessness: that is "access to appropriate, affordable 
accommodation, access to supported accommodation and access to support 
services" (SHTF, 2001a, p.5). Moreov•r, the Tas~force was to provide an 
overall understanding of home!essness itself; how people become homeless; 
and how to assist homeless people back into accommodation. Prevention 
strategies and service provision issues were to be identified, and benchmarks 
and social indicators devised (SHTF, 2001d, p.2). 
The Taskforce had two formal consultation periods prior to the publication of its 
final report. The first was after the circulation of its Issues Paper in September 
2001, and the second after the release of the Draft Report in November 2001 
(SHTF, 2002, p.1 ). The communication and consultation strategies of the 
Taskforce also involved regular informal contact with interested parties. These 
included community welfare organisations; service providers; homeless people; 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people; and organisations representing 
youth, migrants, and people with special needs and/or mental health problems 
(SHTF, 2001a, p.3; 2002, p.i). Consultation occurred via meetings in 
metropolitan and regional areas; newsletters: personal contact; and the 
Taskforce website (SHTF, 2001c; 2001a, p.3). Overall, the Taskforce received 
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100 written submissions, and held 43 gmup consultations and 58 individual 
interviews (SHTF, 2002, p.i). 
One of the aims of the Taskforce was to formulate an improved understanding 
of homelessness. A long running debate exists over a proper definition of 
homelessness, with the common perception being that it equates to 'sleeping 
rough'. However, this is not a realistic description of the homeless population 
(Chamberlain & Johnson, 2001, pp.35,44). As such, the definition adopted by 
the Taskforce acknowledges that people are homeless if they do not have 
access to safe and secure accommodation. It also recognises that there are 
several forms of homelessness, categorised at primary, secondary and tertiary 
levels (SHTF, 2002, p.1 )5 This definition was originally an outcome of the 
Technical Forum on the Estimation of Homelessness in Australia (see Strategic 
Planners, 2001 ), and is the definition promoted by the Commonwealth 
Department for Family and Community Services, and the Commonwealth 
Supported Accommodation Assistance Program National Co-ordination and 
Development Committee (AIHW, 2001, p.326). 
The Taskforce also identified groups at particular risk of homelessness, and its 
findings mirrored those found by the Commonwealth Advisory Committee on 
Homelessne"' (CACH, 2001 ). The West Australian Taskforce also reported 
that there were higher numbers of homeless Indigenous Australians in Western 
Australia than in rnost other states, and identified gay, lesbian and transgender 
5 Primary homelessness is sleeping without shelter; secondary is living in crisis 
accommodation or temporarily with friends and relatives; and tertiary is living in 
caravan parks and in boarding houues for example, where there is no security of 
tenure. 
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people as being at risk of homelessness. This group was not specifically 
recognised in other states' reports, nor in the CACH report (SHTF, 2002, p.63). 
Further, the Taskforce outlined what it considered to be the primary causes of 
homelessness. These causes include a lack of access to affordable and 
appropriate housing; and the low rate of income support payments in 
comparison to the pension, particularly for independent young people. 
Problems with access to services and support services for people who are 
homeless, who are making the transition into accommodation, or who are 
leaving institutional and long-term care, are also major areas of concern. The 
need for prevention and early intervention programs was also highlighted, as 
was the requirement to address the high rate of homelessness amongst 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people (SHTF, 2002, pp.89-109). 
In addition, the Taskforce found that an all-encompassing approach was 
required if homelessness was to be addressed. As a result, many of its 
recommendations require joint initiatives between departments, and State and 
Federal Governments. An Implementation Committee was therefore 
established to oversee the necessary coordination and cooperation. 
Collaboration between Western Australia and the Commonwealth on this issue 
is essential, as the federal nature of the Australian political system impacts 
upon the ways in which homelessness can be tackled. To illustrate, there are 
many issues that contribute to homelessness that the State does not have 
control over. This is highlighted in the Taskforce's Final Report (SHTF, 2002, 
p.85): 
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as a State, Western Australia does not have the ability to direct 
initiatives that relate to income support, economic and 
employment generation, [and] refugee and migrant policies. 
There are also other areas for which both the State and Commonwealth 
Governments are dually responsible. For example, the Commonwealth State 
Housing Assistance Program (CSHA) is jointly funded, with two thirds 
contributed by the Commonwealth and the remainder by the States. The CSHA 
includes public and community housing; crisis accommodation; Aboriginal rental 
housing; and home ownership schemes (Mcintosh & Phillips, 2001 ). A situation 
therefore exists where the Western Australian Government is partially 
dependant upon Commonwealth policy and funding to develop and implement 
programs aimed at addressing homelessness. 
By and large, the recommendations of the Taskforce encapsulate the 
responses required to tackle homelessness that are suggested in the Australian 
literature reviewed for this research (for eg. ACOSS, 2001; AFHO, 2002; P. 
Burke, 1998; T. Burke, 1994; Chamberlain & Johnson, 2001, 2002; HREOC, 
1989; Neil & Fopp, 1994; Raper, 2000). The Taskforce also examined the 
experiences of overseas Governments that are actively attempting to tackle 
hornelessness, including France, Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom and 
Canada (SHTF, 2002, pp.17-22). 
The Taskforce presented its final report to Government at the end of January 
2002. In May, Premier Gallop announced that an additional $32 million would 
be allocated to programs aimed at addressing homelessness, on top of the $34 
million which was already being delivered to ongoing programs (Government of 
Western Australia, 2002). 
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The State Homelessness Taskforce was created in Western Australia following 
the development of homelessness strategies by the Federal and some State 
Governments, and after a sustained lobbying effort by community welfare 
organisations. A wealth of academic research and evidence, and the ripe 
conditions of a pending election, enabled the welfare organisations to convince 
the major parties that homelessness was an issue that had to be tackled by 
government. The final report produced by the Taskforce provided a detailed 
account of strategies to address homelessness in Western Australia. However, 
a more detailed analysis of the Taskforce's findings is outside the scope of this 
research, as is an analysis of how closely the Government's responses 
reflected the recommendations of the Taskforce. Chapter 4 provides an 
overview of the WACOSS and TASWA organisations, and the activities these 
groups undertake. The ways in which these two groups attempted to influence 
the findings and recommendations of the Taskforce are explored in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4 ·Overview of WACOSS and TASWA 
Many pressure groups attempted to influence the findings and 
recommendations of the State Homelessness Taskforce. Two of these groups, 
WACOSS and TASWA, were selected as appropriate case study subjects. 
Preliminary investigations suggested that information provided by the groups 
could form a framework within which it was possible to effectively compare and 
contrast the existing model in the Australian literature with the Aberdeen model. 
This chapter provides a synopsis of the two organisations, and focuses upon 
their aims; key functions; organisational structure; funding; staff; membership; 
the general strategies employed by the organisations in their attempts to 
influence government poliGy decisions; and the status of the groups. 
WACOSS is tne peak body of the community services sector in Western 
Australia. A non-profit O'!lanisation formed in 1956, WACOSS campaigns for a 
more equitable society. It is part of a federation of social se!Vice councils 
throughout Australia that attempt to ensure that the interests of low income and 
disadvantagtd people are promoted and protected (WACOSS, 2001b, p.5). 
The group's mission is: 
to be an effective influence on policies that promote the wellbeing of 
Western Australians; to contribute to the existence of an effective 
and vibrant community services sector; [and] to contribute to an 
informed public opinion on social issues. (WACOSS, 2002b, p.1) 
The organisation has several key functions. It aims to incorporate the concerns 
of its members into government policy via conducting research, formulating 
policy positions, and making submissions to government. It also liaises 
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between government and the community welfare sector, and provides training 
and information resources for its members across the state. Additionally, 
WACOSS holds seminars; runs consultancy and advisory services; and 
participates in capacity building projects and community business partnerships. 
WACOSS also distributes a range of publications; maintains a website; and 
sends a monthly newsletter to over 2000 email addresses (WACOSS, 2001 b, 
p.3; 2002a, pp.5,16-17). 
TASWA was founded in 1979 through Shelter WA, via Commonwealth 
Government funding in response to the recommendations of the 1975 
Henderson Inquiry into Poverty. It is a non-government community legal centre 
whose main objectives are: to promote and represent the interests of tenants 
and prospective tenants; to address the issue of the lack of access to 
appropriate, affordable and secure housing for people in need; and to provide 
services to tenants who require assistance (TASWA, 2002, p.1 ). TASWA target 
their services towards a range of disadvantaged and/or marginalised groups, 
including "people on low incomes, Aboriginal people, people with disabilities, 
older people, young people, recently arrived migrants and refugees, sole 
parents and people with literacy issues" (TASWA, 2002, p.2). 
The functions of TASWA include the provision of infonnation and services to 
tenants and future tenants; to represent these people when necessary; and to 
act on behalf of the community interest. It provides education and training 
services to tenancy advocates; runs a telephone advice line; and publishes and 
distributes infonnation (TASWA, 2002). In 2001/02, TASWA circulated over 
30,000 publications covering a variety of tenancy issues (TASWA, 2002, p.32), 
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received 160,000 hits on its website and had 45,000 pages of information 
requested (TASWA, 2002, p.41). The organisation also distributes a bi-annual 
newsletter to its members (TASWA, 2002, p.10). Furthermore, TASWA 
undertakes research and prepares submissions in the interests of tenants, and 
shares information with the public and with other organisations concerned with 
tenancy issues (TASWA, 2002, p.2). 
Bodies whose members are elected from the membership of the groups control 
both WACOSS and TASWA. However, the structures of each g1oup are slightly 
different. WACOSS has a board, a finance committee and a governance 
committee, and an Executive Director who runs the organisation on a day-to-
day basis (WACOSS, 2002a, p.21). TASWA has an EX<acutive Committee, and 
a Coordinator oversees the functions of the organisation. A TASWA staff 
member sits on its executive body (TASWA, 2002, pp.7-B). 
In addition, both organisations are members of national bodies. The dual 
responsibility of State governments and the Commonwealth for many policy 
areas, including homelessness and housing, means that these networks are 
essential to ensure that issues are addressed at both levels of government. 
WACOSS, and the other state and territory councils of social service, are 
rep>esented by the peak body ACOSS, the Australian Council of Social Service. 
ACOSS is responsible for lobbying the Commonwealth Government on federal 
issues. In June 2002, ACOSS had a membership of nearly 400, comprised of 
national consumer and service provider peak bodies, wt=tlfare agencies, low 
income consumer groups, other associate organisational members and 
individual members (ACOSS, 2002, pp.26-29; n.d). 
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TASWA is a part of NATO, the National Association of Tenant Organisations, a 
federation of state and territory tenants' unions and tenants' advice services. 
NATO has seven members (NATO, 2003, p.2). It allows members to exchange 
information, data and ideas, and occasionally the collective works 
collaboralively on federal issues (J. Purdy, personal communication, September 
8, 2003). In addition, TASWA is the Western Australian representative in the 
Federation of Community Legal Centres (TASWA, 2002, p.36). 
Funding for both WACOSS and TASWA is derived primarily from government 
administered operating grants. Although government grants are a major source 
of revenue, WACOSS also collects substantial amounts of income by 
presenting seminars and providing consultancy services. Project management 
and membership fees, and the sale of publications, also contribute to the 
organisation's income. In the 2001/02 financial year, WACOSS' total operating 
income was $1 ,033,917, and it had accumulated savings of $139,906 
(WACOSS, 2002a, financial statements, pp.9, 14). 
In contrast, TASWA essentially receives its entire revenue ba~:e from 
government-administered grants. The majority of its funding comes ~Tom the 
Rental Accommodation Fund, which is the account containing bond money paid 
by tenants in public housing. Under the relevant legislation, the interest that is 
earned upon these monies is directed towards the provision of tenancy and 
other services. Purdy notes that, in this sense, TASWA's key funding, although 
administered by government, is in fact tenants' monies and not government 
funds. This funding is provided to run the telephone advice line, publish 
tenancy materials, advocate on the behalf of tenants and to train tenancy 
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advocates (J. Purdy, personal communication, January 31, 2004). A smaller 
proportion of funds are supplied by the Commonwealth Government, via Legal 
Aid WA, in the form of a community legal centre grant. Other substantially 
smaller grants also contribute intermittently to the funding of the organisation. 
In the 2001/02 financial year, TASWA had a total operating income of$525,146, 
and had accumulated savings of $75,596 (TASWA, 2002, p.54)6 
WAOOSS therefore has twice the budget of TASWA, although staff numbers at 
the organisations are similar. In September 2003, WACOSS had eleven full-
lime and three part-time staff. The social policy team is a fraction of this 
number, and is spread thinly across a broad range of social issues (Appendix 
2). In August 2003, TASWA had six full-time, five part-time and two casual 
staff, and the organisation focuses only upon tenancy issues. One person is 
employed as a policy officer, with the remainder tending to administrative duties 
and to the fulfilment of other obligations including the operation of the help-tine 
and addressing tenants' legal issues (Appendix 3). 
Both groups have strategic plans to ensure that financial and staffing resources 
are used effectively, and that the organisations fulfil their aims. At WACOSS, 
the Board, after consultation with membars, decides upon priority policy areas. 
At the time of the Taskforce, the priority areas we1e poverty (including housing 
and unemployment), industry policy, Aboriginal issues and family policy 
(WACOSS, 2001c). These priority areas were developed via consultation with 
6 The author was unable to obtain figures that would indicate hovJ ttle size and funding 
of WACOSS and TASWA compares with other pressure groups both within the 
community welfare sector and across the board. The ABS pressure group survey 
(1997) of 700 organisations, which was discontinued, does not supply mean or medium 
income or membership figures. Abbott's survey (1996) of 141 groups similarly dc.'es 
not provide the statistioal data required to enable comparison. 
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community service organisations; sector peak groups and networks; and 
information from ACOSS and the other state and territory councils (WACOSS, 
2001b, p.5). The priority policy area for TASWA is tenancy issues, and its 
strategic plan is amended annually following a full-day review of the plan by 
staff and the Management Committee. Feedback from members and service 
users is also considered at this time (TASWA, personal communication, 
November 23, 2003). 
Both groups have a range of organisational and individual members. In June 
2002, WACOSS had a total of 354 members. This membership is comprised of 
social service organisational members; associate organisational members 
including Centrelink and the Department for Community Development; 
individual members; and associate individual members including several senior 
State Government politicians (Member's Section, WACOSS, 2002a). WACOSS 
also has honorary life members. In addition, it has established partnerships 
with social research centres and schools at Edith Cowan, Murdoch and Curtin 
Universities (Member's Section, WACOSS, 2002a). TASWA had a total of 178 
individual, organisational and life members in June 2002 (TASWA, 2002, p.10). 
A detailed list of TASWA's members is not publicly available, however four of its 
affiliates are members of the Legislative Council, and an individual from a 
TASWA organisational member was on the State Homelessness Taskforce, 
albeit in a personal capacity and not formally as a representative of their 
employer (TASWA, personal communication, 17 December, 2003). 
In order to achieve their mission of influencing government policy, both 
organisations have employed a variety of methods. The use of these tactics 
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varies from issue to issue, and both organisations stress the need to use a 
range of strategies (L. Barron, personal communication, September 23, 2003; J. 
Purdy, personal communication, September 8, 2003). The assortment of 
strategies used by the groups include: representation on government 
committees and advisory boards; making submissions to government inquiries; 
consultation and negotiation with government; publication of research and of a 
newsletter; involvement with a policy network and in public and sector forums; 
and formal contact with ministers (Appendix 3; Appendix 2; WACOSS 2002a, 
p.9; 2001 b pp.5-6). WACOSS also has informal contact with ministers and their 
advisors (Appendix 2). 
In addition, both groups run pre-election campaigns in the hope of gaining 
commitments from the political parties, and facilitate meetings with other 
community organisations within the sector. WACOSS also holds pre-budget 
forums and lobbies government when the budget is drafted. Further, it provides 
general information, policy alternatives, research and feedback directly to 
ministers, ministerial advisors and bureaucrats. WACOSS also acts as a 
gateway between government, service providers and consumers to enable 
government consultation with these groups. In addition to the pre-election 
campaigns, TAWSA provides advice to electorate officers on the resolution of 
individual tenancy cases (Appendix 3; TASWA 2002, p.37-39; 2001a, p.55; 
Appendix 2; WACOSS 2001 b, p.1 ). 
Use of the media is a further strategy utilised by both groups, and it is aimed at 
informing the public and putting pressure on decision-makers. Both groups 
distribute media releases, and are consulted by the media for their point of view. 
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Between October 2001 and June 2002, WACOSS was inteiViewecl 67 times by 
a range of newspapers, and radio and television stations. WACOSS was 
consulted about a broad range of issues, including homelessness; housing; 
state and federal budgets; tax increases; poverty; welfare; the funding and 
resources of community service organisations; and the impact of service charge 
increases on low income earners (WACOSS, 2002a, p.14). TASWA has 
received increasing recognition of its expertise on tenancy and housing issues, 
and has been interviewed several times by newspapers, and television and 
radio programs (TASWA, 2002, p.39). In their attempts to influence policy, 
TASWA also uses, when necessary, talk-back radio, public protests, letter and 
fax campaigns, and court action (Appendix 3). 
Analysis of the groups' documentation, and their responses to the survey 
(Appendices 2 & 3), makes it possible to categorise the status of the two 
organisations. Under the Richard Court Liberal Government, the input of 
WACOSS into the decision-making process was marginal in comparison to its 
experiences under the Gallop Labor Government (Appendix 2). Although many 
of the pre-mentioned strategies were utilised, their impacts were not widely felt 
(Appendix 2). However, the election of the Gallop Labor Government opened 
more channels of access for WACOSS, and its role in the decision-making 
process on social policy issues increased significantly (Appendix 2; WACOSS, 
2001b, p.3). The upsurge in the representation of WACOSS on government 
committees and advisory boards from 13 in 2000/01 to 26 in 2001/02 is an 
indicator of its heightened position. The breadth of issues in which WACOSS 
was involved also increased and included water use; telecommunications in 
remote, rural and regional areas; sustainability; the regional development 
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leadership plan; and employment (WACOSS, 2001b, pp.B-9; 2002a, p.12). In 
addition, WACOSS, along with several other peak community organisations, 
established a regular meeting with the Director General of the Department for 
Housing and Works (TASWA, 2002, p.6). 
TASWA's influence under the Court Government was limited, and this situation 
has remained unchanged under the Gallop Government (Appendix 3). The 
organisation has however had sporadic episodes of significant influence in 
policy debates. For example, it was instrumental in the reformation of the 
Residential Tenancies Act, and in the annulment of a former Homeswest media 
policy (J. Purdy, personal communication, January 31, 2004). TASWA is also 
represented on several government committees and advisory boards concerned 
with community legal centre issues, and housing and tenancy issuos. In 
2000/01 it was on four government committees (TASWA, 2001a, p.53), and on 
five in 2001/02 (TASWA, 2002, pp.36-38). TASWA also attends the meeting 
with the Director General of the Department for Housing and Works. The 
establishment of this meeting in 2001/02 is considered by TASWA to be a 
highlight of that year (TASWA, 2002, p.6). 
To summarise, this chapter provides a brief outline of the two pressure groups 
that are the focus of this research. The organisations have many similar 
functions, and aim to protect the interests of disadvantaged groups within 
soci"::·. They do this by attempting to ensure that government policy 
adequately accounts for the wellbeing of these groups. Chapter 5 investigates 
the specific strategies employed by WACOSS and TASWA in their attempts to 
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influence the findings and recommendations of the State Homelessness 
Taskforce. 
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Chapter 5 - Pressure Group Activities and the 
State Homelessness Taskforce 
The establishment of a government Taskforce into a complex public policy issue 
such as homelessness offers unique opportunities to study pressure group 
activities. In relation to the State Homelessness Taskforce, both WACOSS and 
TASWA took advantage of the process and developed strategies to enhance 
their influencA upon public policy. This chapter details the activities in which 
WACOSS and TASWA were involved immediately prior to, and during, the 
State Homelessness Taskforce. The strategies of the groups included the pre-
election lobbying of political parties; correspondence with Ministers; attendance 
at community sector meetings; and the formation of alliances with other 
organisations. Additionally, both groups made detailed submissions to the 
Taskforce in response to its Issues Paper and Draft Report. The attempts by 
the groups to influence the findings and recommendations of the Taskforce are 
presented in chronological order. WACOSS' activities are examined first, 
followed by TASWA's. 
WACOSS' campaign for the State to devise a homelessness strategy began 
with the lobbying of political parties prior to the February 2001 election. All 
political parties responded positively, and WACOSS drew up a scorecard oi the 
parties' election social policy promises (WACOSS, 2000, p.10; 2001c, pp:l-2,7). 
WACOSS established a line of communication with the newly-instated Minister 
for Housing, and conveyed the organisation's position that any move to address 
homelessness by the Gallop Government must incorporate an across 
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departmental approach (WACOSS, 2001 d). Stephens (2001 a), lhe Minister for 
Housing, agreed lhat this would be the most appropriate strategy. 
WACOSS' plan for lhe Government to address homelessness, and for 
WACOSS to play a key role in the development of a homelessness strategy, 
was gaining momentum. However, its campaign v-.tas momentarily derailed 
when the Ministry of Housing, at the request of the Minister (Stephens, 2001a), 
convened a meeting with housing service providers in mid~March 2001. This 
was the first discussion held by the new Government about its intention to 
devise and implement a homelessness strategy, however WACOSS was not 
invited to attend (Ministry of Housing, 2001 a). 
WACOSS acted quickly to ensure that this was not to be a precedent for the 
involvement of the organisation in the development of a homelessness strategy. 
In a letter to the Housing Minister, dated one day prior to the scheduled 
meeting, WACOSS outlined its concerns. These included that many key 
consumer and housing service provider groups, including WACOSS, had not 
been invited to participate at the first meeting about "the Strategy; that without 
the input of non-government groups and non-housing service providers, the 
focus of the Strategy would not be all encompassing; and that due to the short 
notice given about lhe meeting (two days), there was also a risk that some 
organisations would be unable to attend. This would impact upon the breadth 
of organisations represented at the meeting. In closing, WACOSS reiterated its 
commitment to addressing homelessness, and its willingness to work with the 
Government on this issue (WACOSS, 2001 d). 
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In reply to this letter, Minister Stephens tried to placate the organisation. He 
stated that he specifically wanted feedback from housing service providers at 
the first meeting, and that a second meeting was to be held which would involve 
the broader sector. He also acknowledged the 'value', 'knowledge' and 'good 
work' of WACOSS and other non-housing service providers (Stephens, 2001 a). 
In the end, WACOSS did in fact have a delegate attend this first meeting 
(Mould, 2001 ). 
The second meeting about the development of a homelessness strategy was 
held at the end of March 2001, and it was from this time onwards that 
WACOSS' involvement in the process became firmly established. Any 
interested non-government sector organisations were invited to attend the 
forum, which was co-hosted by WACOSS and two other community sector 
organisations. These three groups were delegated to be representatives of the 
community sector organisations who attended the meeting. A list of short-term 
strategies to address hornelessness was devised at the forum, and this was 
presented to the Managing Director of the Ministry for Housing by the delegates 
in early April (Organisation A, 2001 a). 
At the second meeting it was also decided that another working party was 
required to focus on the long-term solutions to homelessness. The Long-Term 
Group, also referred to as the Non-Government Working Party, was to ascertain 
the views of the community sector about the best approach to formulate a 
homelessness strategy, and to feed these ideas directly to Government (Non-
Government Working Party, 2001a). WACOSS took a lead role in the Long-
Term Working Party, and it became responsible for the administration of its 
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meetings (L. Barron, personal communication, March 26, 2003; WACOSS, 
2001 b, p. 7). The Executive Director of WACOSS became the liaison person 
between the Long-Term group and the Taskforce convenors (WACOSS, 
2001e), and the President of WACOSS, who was also the Director of 
Centrecare, was appointed as the Chairperson of the Taskforce in June 2001, 
albeit in a personal capacity and not officially as a representative of his 
employer organisations. 
The Long-Term Working Party held two meetings in May 2001. It called for a 
State Homelessness Taskforce to be formed that would take a whole-of-
government approach to addressing homelessness. It further outlined why a 
homelessness strategy was needed; what the key outcomes of the strategy 
should be; and the types of organisations and government departments that 
should be represented on the Taskforce. Additionally, the Working Party 
charted what it believed should be the goals; terms of reference; time frame; 
and consultation process of the proposed Taskforce (Non-Government Working 
Party, 2001a; 2001 b, pp.1-5). 
WACOSS also attended the meetings of the Short-Term Working Party (2001) 
in early May, and the Party's meeting with the Ministry of Housing in mid-May 
(Ministry of Housing, 2001b). However, WACOSS' involvement with the Long-
Term group became its primary focus (L. Barron, personal communication, 
March 26, 2003). WACOSS was also involved in consultation on homelessness 
issues at the local government level, and the organisation was represented at 
the Homelessness Seminar held by the City of Perth in August 2001. Service 
providers within the City of Perth, relevant government departments, and a 
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member of the Taskforce Secretariat were present at the seminar, which 
discussed how the City could be involved in the across-government strategy 
(Dunne, 2001 ). 
Shortly after the first meeting of the Long-Term Working Party, WACOSS was 
approached by another organisation with the prospect of forming an alliance. In 
a letter from the Chairperson of that organisation, it was proposed that 
representatives from the groups should meet to discuss the formation of a loose 
coalition, whereby they could work together on issues of shared interest. The 
approaching organisation felt that working together, the groups would be a 
stronger force, and could have a greater impact upon social policy 
(Organisation A, 2001b).7 In response, the President ofWACOSS commented 
favourably to WACOSS' Executive Director that "there would seem to be 
significant value in such a meeting given the current environment and tho need 
for the sector to forge respectful alliances" (Organisation A, 2001 b). 
A sector consultation meeting was convened by WACOSS and another leading 
community sector organisation in late September, to discuss matters arising 
from the Taskforce's Issues Paper that had been released earlier that month. 
The outcomes of this meeting; previous research conducted by WACOSS; and 
consultation with other key stakeholders, were the basis for WACOSS' 
submission to the Taskforce Issues Paper (WACOSS, 2001a, p.2). According 
to Barron (personal communication, March 26, 2003), the sector, in general, 
was dissatisfied with the poor content and lack of analysis within the Issues 
Paper. WACOSS' submission reflected this scrutiny and highlighted the 
7 Consent has not been sought from the other organisations involved in the Taskforce 
process, and as such they have not been identified. 
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structural causes of homelessness which had not been adequately explored by 
the Taskforce to date (WACOSS, 2001, p.2). 
The perceived shortcomings of the Issues Paper fuelled further discontent 
amongst those organisations that were already displeased with the Taskforce 
process. A number of groups had been disgruntled with the Taskforce process 
from the outset, as several key organisations had not been invited to sit on the 
Taskforce. In addition, it was argued that the Taskforce was primarily 
comprised of representatives of housing service providers, and failed to 
incorporate an adequate number of organisations or individuals representing 
consumers (L. Barron, personal communication, March 26, 2003). These 
events laid the foundation for the breaking away by some groups and 
individuals from the formal process, and to the establishment of an alternative 
taskforce. TASWA was amongst the groups who split away, however 
WACOSS chose to stay within the formal process. 
The next documented meeting was the Homelessness Forum on 12 December 
2001, which was jointly he'd by WACOSS and two other community sector 
organisations. This meeting was called in response to the release of the 
Taskforce's Draft Report. Twenty-five people, from a range of organisations 
including community legal centres, women's refuges and accommodation 
providers, attended the meeting. A representative from the Taskforce 
Secretariat was also present (Shelter WA, 2001 ). Discussions at the forum, and 
research conducted by WACOSS, infomned the organisation's submission to 
the Taskforce's Draft Report. WACOSS viewed the Draft Report as a 
significant improvement upon the Issues Paper. However, it remained critical of 
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the insufficient analysis of the causes of homelessness within the Draft Report. 
WACOSS also asserted that, due to the extent of Indigenous homelessness, 
there should be a separate action plan specifically for Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people. A moratorium on evictions from public housing was also 
called for (WACOSS, 20011, pp.1-5). In the period between the release of the 
Taskforce's Final Report at the end of January 2002, ond the Government's 
response in May, WACOSS strongly lobbied the Government in an attempt to 
gain a favourable reaction to the Taskforce's findings and recommendations 
(WACOSS, 2002a, p.8). 
TASWA similarly ran a pre-election campaign in 2000/01 to raise awareness of 
tenancy issues amongst candidates. Specifically, it highlighted the need to 
address policy and legislation that has adverse impacts upon tenants and which 
contributes to the problem of homelessness in Western Australia. After the 
election, TASWA followed up its campaign by meeting with new Ministers and 
other members of Parliament. TASWA was also part of the push to establish a 
homelessness taskforce (TASWA. 2001a, p.55). 
TASWA became involved in the non-government sector's drive for a state 
homelessness strategy, and it attended the open meeting held in March 2001. 
The organisation became a member of the Long-Term Workin[l Party (Non-
Government Working Party, 2001b, p.1; WACOSS, 2001g), and also attended 
the meeting of the Short-Term Group at the Ministry of Housing in May. 
Furthermore, TASWA corresponded with the new Minister for Housing and 
acknowledged his willingness to address homelessness. The organisation also 
aired some of its concerns, which included the claim by the Ministry for Housing 
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that there had been a lack of demand for its accommodation. This claim, 
TASWA asserted, could not be substantiated, and the existence of long public 
housing waiting lists was proof of the absurdity of such a claim (TASWA, 
2001b). 
In addition, TASWA saw the formation of alliances as integral to its ability to 
influence the Taskforce cutcomes. It contacted another community sector 
organisation8 , which was on;J of "delegates of the Long-Term Working Party, 
'~-: ensure it was informed of new developments, and to reinforce its willingness 
to contribute to the process (TASWA, 2001c). The two organisations provided 
feedback to each other for the duration of the Taskforce process (TASWA, 
2001d; TASWA & Organisation B, 2001). The initial letter from TASWA to the 
second organisation was also forwarded to the Minister for Housing (TASWA, 
2001c). 
In July 2001, TASWA's Co-ordinator, Dr Jeannine Purdy, was invited to be a 
member of the Taskforce. Purdy accepted this invitation on behalf of TASWA, 
and not in a personal capacity as was outlined in her invitation. Purdy did this in 
recognition that, in reality, the Taskforce members' affiliations to their employer 
organisations could not, and should not, be ignored. Alliances and allegiances 
would, she argued, ultimately impact upon the findings and recommendations of 
the Taskforce, as the majority of Taskforce members were from housing seNice 
providers. TASWA was the only consumer organisation represented (J. Purdy, 
personal communication, September 8, 2003). 
8 refer footnote 7, p.53. 
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In facl, it quickly became apparent to Purdy that her points of view on the 
causes of homelessness, being primarily of a structural nature, and the 
methods to address those issues, was outnumbered on the Taskforce. Purdy 
comments that even though housing service providers have a thorough 
understanding of issues relating to homelessness, they have a different 
perspective to the consumers of those services (J. Purdy, personal 
communication, September 8, 2003). 
The TASWA Co-ordinator was also concerned that the soon to be released 
Issues Paper did not place a great enough emphasis upon independent 
research, or the academic literature on homelessness. Purdy believed the 
Issues Paper was too focused on the personal causes of homelessness, and 
ignored the structural causes. This reflected her view that the Government had 
chosen the composition of the Taskforce with the outcomes it wanted in mind. 
Hence, Purdy was concerned that the Taskforce lacked sufficient 
independence, and that the many personal inter-relationships between and 
within the Taskforce and its Secretariat would stifle discussion and co-opt 
consensus. Furthermore, many of the organisations represented on the 
Taskforce were reliant upon government funding which, Purdy argues, limited 
their capacity to be critical of government policies and decisions (Purdy, 2001a, 
2001b). 
Purdy made her concerns known to the Taskforce and its Secretariat in late 
August 2001, and provided a range of academic resources to support her 
claims. When none of the points she raised at the meeting with the Secretariat 
were incorporated into the final draft of the Issues Paper, Purdy, with the full 
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support of the TASWA Committee, resigned from her position on the Taskforce 
(J. Purdy, personal communication, September 8, 2003). After Purdy's 
resignation and the release of the Issues Paper, TASWA made a formal 
submission to the Taskforce. In its submission, TASWA reiterated the points 
which Purdy had raised with the other Taskforce members and its Secretariat 
prior to her resignation (TASWA, 2001e). 
The next major development involving TASWA occurred at the Homelessness 
Forum in September 2001. At this meeting it was decided, by a number of 
organisations in attendance that were unhappy with the Government's 
Taskforce process, that an Alternative Taskforce be established. TASWA staff 
and committee members, including Purdy, were a driving force behind the 
formation of the Coalition (HTHC, 2001 a; J. Purdy, personal communication, 
September 8, 2003). The Alternative Taskforce consisted of 12 individuals 
including employees of TASWA, a men's hostel and a church-based social 
justice group, as well as a tenant of Homeswect housing (HTHC, 2001 b; J. 
Purdy, personal communication, November 11, 2003). A decision was made 
that the members of the Alternative Taskforce would not formally represent their 
employer agencies due to concerns that the agencies' funding could be 
impacted upon. However, two organisations, one of which was TASWA, agreed 
to help resource the Alternative Taskforce (J. Purdy, personal communication, 
January 31, 2004 ). In October, a meeting of these individuals was held and a 
draft Statement on the causes and responses required to address 
homelessness was composed. In early November, the Statement was agreed 
/o by all parties involved, and the alliance named itself the Housing the 
Homeless Coalition (HTHC, 2001 c). 
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The Housing the Homeless Coalition released its Statement in mid-November 
2001. In the Statement, the Coalition oullined ils charges against the 
Government Taskforce. These included that il placed too little emphasis upon 
the lack of access to affordable, secure and appropriale housing, and upon the 
absence of State funding for public housing in Western Auslralia. The 
Alternative Taskforce also believed lhat the Issues Paper placed too great an 
emphasis upon the personal factors that contribute to homelessness, and that 
the paper contained racist attitudes. In addition, solutions required to address 
homeless ness were detailed (HTHC, 2001 d). The group's Statemenl was senl 
to the Ministers for Housing and Community Developmenl, and circulaled to the 
Premier, the Minister for Indigenous Affairs, Taskforce members, and its 
Secretariat (HTHC, 2001a). 
It should be noted that the Coalilion did not regard ils Statement as a 
submission to the formal Taskforce. Rather, the Statement was released to 
highlight the ability of the Alternative Taskforce Ia work effectively oulside of the 
formal process, and to provide a detailed account of the causes of, and 
responses to, homelessness: a feat that the formal Taskforce seemed 
incapable of achieving. The Cnalilion members believed that as their input to 
the Taskforce had previously been ignored, this was the most effeclive way of 
influencing the Ministers responsible for the formulation of a homelessness 
strategy (J. Purdy, personal communication, 6 January, 2004). 
The Ministers for Housing and Community Development replied favourably to 
the Coalilion's Statement. Minister Stephens commented "I read the Coalition's 
statement wilh interest and share your concern about the lack of affordable 
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housing in Western Australia" (Stephens, 2001 b). Minister McHale went further 
by stating that she had "asked the Taskforce to further consider the Housing the 
Homeless Coalition statement in their deliberations", and that "it is inspiring to 
see the depth of commitment in the community to resolving the issues of 
homelessness" (McHale, 2001 ). 
At the end of November, the Taskforce's Draft Report was released and The 
West Australian approached the Coalition for its comments on the Report. The 
Coalition's views were subsequently reported in an article about the Taskforce. 
The Coalition believed that the Draft Report was more comprehensive and an 
improvement upon the Issues Paper. However, it still had serious concerns 
about the lack of state funding for public housing (Casellas, 2001, p.40; HTHC, 
2001e) .. 
In December 2001, TASWA attended the Homelessness Forum which was held 
by WACOSS and two other community sector organisations. Shortly thereafter, 
the organisation made a submission to the Draft Report, to which it attached the 
Coalition's statement. This reinforced the stance taken both by TASWA staff 
and committee members, and the other individuals involved in the Alternative 
Taskforce, and enabled TASWA to air some tenancy issues that had not been 
included in the Coalition's Statement (J. Purdy, personal communication, 
September 8, 2003). 
TASWA was pleased that the Draft Report had explored the issue of access to 
affordable, safe and appropriate housing, however many concerns remained 
unexplored. It was critical of the Taskforce's failure to adequately consider and 
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analyse all causes of homeless ness, even though this was a term of reference. 
There were also several issues that TASWA had lobbied for previously, which 
had not been included in the report. These included discussion of Homeswest 
policies and their contribution to homelessness, and the need for a moratorium 
on evictions from public housing (TASWA, 20011). 
As can be seen from the above analysis, there were key similarities and 
differences in the aclivities of WACOSS and TASWA in their attempts to 
influence the State Homelessness Taskforce. Both organisations were involved 
in lobbying the Government to establish the Taskforce; corresponded with the 
Minister for Housing; and attended a range of meetings and forums. Both 
organisations also recognised the usefulness of forming alliances, and made 
research-based Sllbmissions to the Taskforce's Issues Paper and Draft Report. 
H0wever, WACOSS and TASWA did pursue different paths: WACOSS chose to 
work within the formal process, while TASWA aligned itself with the Alternalive 
Taskforce. Why the groups pursued the different strategies they did is explored 
in detail in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 - Pressure Groups and Strategic 'Choices' 
Pressure groups aim to influence the policy agenda, and the way in which policy 
is devised and implemented. Groups utilise a range of tactics in their attempts 
to achieve these goals. An exploration of the motivations behind the strategies 
employed by WACOSS and TASWA in their attempts to influence the State 
Homelessness Taskforce is presented in this Chapter. The Aberdeen group's 
contentior. that organisations do not have choices in the strategies they pursue 
will also be discussed. 
WACOSS' actions during the Taskforce typify the insider style under both the 
existing and Aberdeen models.9 Of prominence is the organisation's decision to 
stay within the formal Taskforce process when other groups broke away to form 
the Alternative Taskforce. Firstly, WACOSS did not feel it could leave the 
formal process when its own President was chairing the Taskforce (L. Barron, 
personal communication, September 23, 2003), as this would surely sour its 
relations with the newly elected Government. WACOSS also recognised that 
building and maintaining a relationship with the new Government was integral to 
the future success of the organisation in influencing policy, and, due to having 
interests across the broad range of social policy issues, WACOSS could ill-
afford to place itself offside on this issue and possibly adversely affect its level 
of insider status on other issues. 
The new Housing Minister also appeared cons;derably more focused on 
addressing homelessness than his predecessor, and WACOSS did not want to 
9 This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7. 
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distance itself from a more amenable Minister. Additionally, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, homelessness had not been on the policy agenda. The organisation 
therefore saw the Taskforce as a strategic opportunity to have government 
acknowledge and address the causes and consequences of homelessness. 
WACOSS was also not convinced that the formation of an Alternative Taskforce 
would be an effective strategy, so it opted to stay inside the fonnal process and 
attempt to exert an influence from within (L. Barron, personal communication, 
March 26 & September 23, 2003). 
TASWA similarly made use of insider strategies. However, when the 
organisation failed to have any impact upon the process, it switched to outsider 
methods. There were a number of factors that lead to TASWA's change of 
tactics. From the outset, the organisation was sceptical that the Taskforce 
would achieve outcomes that would effectively address homelessness, and, 
most obviously, the organisation felt that it would not have its views 
incorporated into the Taskforce's recommendations via the formal channels. 
This became clearly evident to the group after Purdy's input was ignored. 
TASWA also had less to lose by switching to outsider methods than some of the 
other groups involved in the Taskforce. It was a small group with a 
comparatively narrow policy focus; it had a low level of insider status; and it was 
not a group from which bureaucrats routinely sought information (Appendix 3). 
The Aberdeen group would question the extent to which WACOSS and TASWA 
had real choices in the strategies they employed. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
the aims of the group; its history; the expectations of its members: and funding 
sources; are all determinants of the strategies an organisation pursues. When 
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these points are examined, it is clear that neither WACOSS nor TASWA had 
real choices over the strategies they employed in their attempts to influence the 
State Homelessness Taskforce. 
WACOSS' primary aim of influencing government policy is best fulfilled by 
bargaining and negotiating with government. Its only real option therefore is to 
employ insider strategies (Maloney et al., 1994, pp.34-35). Pursuing a more 
antagonistic strategy is also not in line with the goals of the organisation. A 
further factor constricting the strategic choi"es of the group are its history. 
WACOSS does not have a record of utilising outsider methods, except for in 
once instance when it ran a campaign publicising the group's reduction in 
funding by the Richard Court liberal Government (L. Barron, personal 
communication, September 23, 2003). This campaign involved the utilisation of 
a mixture of insider and outsider strategies (L. Barron, personal communication, 
January 20, 2004 ). 
Furthermore, the organisation, for the most part, does not have a membership 
that solicits the use of outsider methods. On occasions where a member of 
WACOSS disagrees with WACOSS' strategy on a particular issue, that member 
is free to act in their own interests and to pursue their own, separate 
strategies.10 In addition, WACOSS is not reliant upon membership dues for the 
bulk of its income. Therefore, pressure from groups and/or individuals within 
the membership of WACOSS for the organisation to employ outsider strategies 
does not tend to impact upon the tactics that WACOSS utilises. 
1° For example, TASWA is a member of WACOSS. 
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However, WACOSS' reliance upon government funding can, to some extent, 
affect the strategic choices made by the group. Barron (personal 
communication, December 2, 2003) notes that the possibility of the 
organisation's actions resulting in funding reductions is always a consideration. 
Nevertheless, Barron remarks that the main factor which determines strategy is 
what the organisation believes will be the most effective method to achieve its 
aims. As a general rule, and as evidenced by the actions of the group, 
WACOSS believes that using insider strategies will result in the group exerting 
a greater influence upon decision-makers. 
TASWA's choice of strategy was similarly inhibited. While the organisation 
normally attempted to achieve its aims via insider methods, it had little choice 
but to make use of outsider tactics in its quest to influence the findings and 
recommendations of the Taskforce. Even though TASWA did have intermittent 
instancos of high-level input into the policy process, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
it recognised that this would not occur with the Taskforce. Also, it was 
considered by its members, and within the wider sector, as an organisation that 
took a very principled approach in the pursuit of its aims. The group therefore 
had a history of occasionally employing outsider tactics when it was deemed 
necessary (J. Purdy, personal communication, 11 November 2003), and such 
tactics may have been expected in the case of the HomelAssness Taskforce. 
Due to the importance of addressing homelessness effectively, and TASWA's 
concern that the Taskforce's failure to adequately recognise the structural 
causes of homelessness would reduce the effectiveness of a homelessness 
strategy, it concluded that its only option was to employ outsider methods. 
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Funding is an ongoing concern for TASWA, and strategies that may have 
negatively impacted upon funding are always considered carefully. Financial 
issues seem however to have had less of an impact upon TASWA's choice of 
strategies during the Taskforce than would be expected. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the group is wholly reliant upon government-administered grants, 
and it has had its funding reduced in the past after involvement with the Anti-
Section 64 Coalition during the America's Cup (J. Purdy, personal 
communication, 11 November, 2003).11 The group is therefore well aware that 
funding cuts are a consequence that must always be considered (J. Purdy, 
personal communication, December 3, 2003). An indication of the principled 
way in which TASWA undert.'lok its role of representing the interests of tenants 
is that it made the decision to pursue outsider methods during the State 
Homelessness Taskforce regardless of these funding concerns. The group is 
therefore prepared to take calculated risks when it believes core principles, and 
the rights of tenants, are at stake (J. Purdy, personal communication, December 
3, 2003).12 
During the State Homelessness Taskforce, WACOSS pursued an insider 
strategic style, whilst TASWA utilised a range of insider and outsider tactics. 
The strategic methods utilised by the two organisations amply demonstrate the 
Aberdeen group's contentions that pressure groups do not effectively have 
choices in the strategies they employ: in both cases, the strategic choices of the 
groups were inhibited by the aims of the group; its history; the expectations of 
11 The Anti~Section 64 Coalition was a group of community sector agencies in Western 
Australia who were concerned with Homeswest's use of Section 64 of the Residential 
Tenancies Act to evict public housing tenants without just cause (Ninyette, 1995, p.1) 
12 Decisions to proceed witt1 actions that may impact upon the group's source of 
revenue are made by the Management Committee (J. Purdy, personal communication, 
December 3, 2003). 
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its members; and the recognition that the use of outsider strategies may result 
in a reduction in government funding. Financial considerations do however 
appear to be less of an impediment to TASWA's use of outsider slrategies, 
particularly when its core principle; are at stake. In Chapter 7, the case study 
dala will be used to determine thu effecliveness of the existing model in the 
Australian literature, and the applicability of the Aberdeen model in the 
Australian context. 
G7 
Chapter 7 • Conclusions: the Effectiveness of the 
Insider/Outsider Model 
The aim of this research has been to determine the effectiveness of the existing 
understanding of insider and outsider pressure groups in the Australian 
literature, referred to throughout this thesis as the existing model, and the 
applic3bility of the Aberdeen model in the Australian context. Case studies of 
two organisations, WACOSS and TASWA, were undertaken, and the analysis 
of the case study data enabled the comparison and contrast of the existing 
model, with the more recently conceptualised Aberdeen model from the British 
literature. The results of this analysis indicate that the existing model is 
ineffective in categorising pressure groups in a meaningful way, and that the 
Aberdeen model is a more useful classificatory tool. As such, the Australian 
pressure group literature would be greatly enhanced by further exploration of 
the Aberdeen model. 
Under the existing model examined in Chapter 2, WACOSS would be classified 
as an insider group. It has access to decision-makers; is seen to be influential; 
and uses standard, accepted methods to try to achieve its gaols. This 
classification is not contentious. However, the existing model does not 
adequately address the reality that there are degrees of 'insiderness'. For 
example, the input of some groups may be seen as integral to the development 
of relevant and effective policy across a range of issues, or only upon a few 
issues. Others may simply play by lhe rules of the game but exert little 
influence. 
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To classify organisations, which fall inlo all of the above categories, into one 
definition, does not offer an in-depth understanding of the role of pressure 
groups in the policy process. The Aberdeen model, however, enables pressure 
groups to be classified with all of these points taken into consideration. Under 
the Gallop Labor Government, WACOSS could be classified not only as a group 
wilh insider status, but as a core insider in social policy circles (Appendix 2): 
that is, as a group at the top level of meaningful interaction with government on 
social policy issues. As per the definition of a core insider outlined in Chapter 2, 
WACOSS is not necessarily influential across the entire social policy area, but 
rather upon a range of issues in which the group is recognised to have 
particular expertise (WACOSS, personal communication, January 30, 2004). In 
greater detail, under the Aberdeen model WACOSS can be described as a 
group which has core insider status and which uses insider strategies. 
The actions and experiences of TASWA during the Taskforce offer further 
evidence of the inadequacies of the existing model. Under the existing 
typology, TASWA would be classified as an outsider group, not necessarily 
because it completely fits this definition, but rather by default, as it does not fulfil 
the criteria of an insider group: it is not viewed as very influential and it does, at 
times, use outsider methods. Again, the Aberdeen model enables groups such 
as TASWA to be defined more accurately. 
Even though TASWA resorted to an outsider approach in its attempts to 
influence the State Homelessness Taskforce, it is not actually an outsider group 
as the existing model implies: it is viewed as legitimate by decision-makers; is 
represented on several government committees and advisory boards; and does, 
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on the whole, participate in the insider style of politics. However, the group 
does employ a combination of insider and outsider tactics. This is amply 
demonstrated by TASWA's actions during the Taskforce: in addition to its 
involvement in the Alternative Taskforce and its loud criticism of the formal 
process, TASWA simultaneously made its own separate submissions to the 
fonnal process. 
Therefore, rather than being incorrectly labelled as an outsider group, TASWA, 
under the Aberdeen model, can be classified as an organisation of minimal 
influence which has peripheral insider status, and which employs thresholder 
strategies. TASWA's use of different strategies illustrates the Aberdeen group's 
fundamental criticism of othar insider/outsider models: that they 'conflate' status 
and strategy, equating insider status with the exclusive use of insider strategies, 
and outsider status with outsider strategies. 
The existing model in the Australian literature also implies that decision~makers 
will generally be unresponsive to, and unswayed by, groups that use outsider 
methods. The positive responses by the Ministers for Housing and Community 
Development to the Alternative Taskforce Statement (refer Chapter 5) illustrate 
that this appears not to have been the case with the Alternative Taskforce. It is 
difficult to determine the level of the Coalition's influence, although the 
comments made by the Ministers indicate that the views of the Alternative 
Taskforce were not out-rightly disregarded, and Purdy (pensonal 
communication, January 31, 2004) notes that the Coalition itself was pleased 
that acknowledgment of the structural causes of homelessness were eventually 
incorporated into the official Taskforce's Final Report. 
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The experiences of WACOSS under the previous Liberal Government also 
highlight a further deficiency of the existing model. The literature on this model 
in Australia suggests that an organisation from the community welfare sector, 
which is on the centre-left of the political spectrum and is therefore far removed 
from the Liberal Party ideologically, and which is in no wa)' economically 
significant, would be considered an outsider under a Liberal Government. 
However, this is misleading and does not adequately reflect the actual situation. 
WACOSS believes that under the Richard Court Liberal Government it was able 
to influence some social policy decisions, and bureaucrats and advisors did 
seek information and advice from WACOSS on some social policy issues 
(Appendix 2). WACOSS was also represented on a number of government 
advisory boards and committees during the term of the Court Government 
(WACOSS, 2001 b, pp.8-9; Appendix 2). II should also be noteu that the 
organisation tried to achieve its goals via the use of insider methods under the 
Court Government, and only resorted to the use of outsider strategies on one 
instance when its funding was reduced (L. Barron, personal communication, 
September 23, 2003; Appendix 2). 
In contrast to the existing model, the insider/outsider typology articulated by the 
Aberdeen group would not classify WACOSS as an outsider group under the 
previous State Government. Rather, the Aberci~en model offers a more 
accurate definition of the organisation: as a specialist insider group. WACOSS 
was not very influential across the broad social policy area, but it did have 
influence in some key policy areas and its input was both canvassed and 
respected by d'3cision-makers (Appendix 2). Furthermore, the organisation can 
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be classified as pursing insider strategies during this period, and as utilising a 
thresholder strategy in one instance. 
Although the Aberdeen model offers a more comprehensive and sophisticated 
understanding of insider and outsider groups than the existing model prevalent 
in the Australian literature, users of the Aberdeen model in the Australian 
context must be mindful of the impact of ideological differences upon status. 
The role of ideology in the ascription of higher levels of insider status is not 
highlighted within the Aberdeen model, as i!s authors believe that in the British 
setting it is the resources of a group which are a greater determinant of the level 
of insider status ascribed (Maloney et al., 1994, p.36). Group resources are 
important in the Australian setting (Abbott, 1996, p.11 0; Jaensch, 1994, p.178; 
Willmott & Dowse, 2000, p.165), however the experiences of WACOSS under 
the Richard Court Liberal, and then the Gallop Labor State Governments, 
indicate that ideology continues to be a factor in the level of access groups are 
permitted, and whether or not they are in the position to bargain and negotiate 
with government.13 This supports the assertions of Warhurst and Matthews, as 
examined Chapter 2. Nonetheless, the Aberdeen model's recognition that 
ideological difference• do not automatically result in a group being excluded 
from the consultation process and bE:ing exiled to the outsider realm, are 
important distinctions which do apply in the Australian context. In the case of 
WACOSS for example, changes in government have seen its level of insider 
status change, not its type of status. 
13 ACOSS had a similar experience when its level of status was reduced by the 
incoming Liberal Federal Government in 1996 (Beresford, 2000, p.120). 
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The experiences of TASWA ,,re somewhat different. Its influence over policy 
decisions and its level of access to decision~makers has varied little over the 
terms of the two State Governments, and its insider status has remained at the 
peripheral level (Appendix 3). The consistency in TASWA's low level of access 
may be attributable to a combination of factors. These include the 
organisation's lack of resources; its willingness to resort to outsider strategies; 
and that the organisation may be considered too far left ideologically by both 
Liberal and Labor Governments for it to be given access to the inner sanctum of 
bargaining and negotiation. Purdy (personal communication, February 2, 2004) 
comments that it is not necessarily the group which is too far left ideologically, 
but the issue it represents, as neither Labor or Liberal Governments want to 
adequately fund expensive public housing schemes. TASWA is therefore not 
considered to be a key player in the policy process by either party, although it is 
accepted as a legitimate group which has access to decision-makers via 
consultation processes. 
A further flaw in the existing understanding of insider and outsider groups in the 
Australian literature is its failure to account for the use of the media by insider 
groups. The Aberdeen model also does not offer insight into the use of this 
strategic tool. Use of the media by insider groups tends to be understated, 
and/or underestimated, within the literature on the existing model, which 
suggests that use of the media is, for the most part, solely within the outsider 
realm (for example Singleton et al., 2003, p.355; Willmott & Dowse, 2000, 
p.163). A brief examination of the websites of some prominent lobby groups 
with insider status in Australia, including the Australian Institute of Petroleum, 
the Business Council of Australia, the Australian Chamber of Commerce and 
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Industry and the National Farmers Federation, indicates that all of these groups 
use the media at the most basic level: that is they distribute media releases and 
have them available on-line. 
Use of the media by some insider groups is an occurrence identified by Grant, 
who labelled insider groups who use the media to raise public support on issues 
as 'high profile'. Grant comments that since the 1970s, insider groups have 
incre:o;~:!ngly used the media to reinforce their other strategies, and that this is a 
'crucial sYJ!:' that pressure groups must acquire. He notes Whitely and 
Winyard's commei :(S that use of the media by groups is now considered by 
decision~makers to be standard practice in Britain, and does not tend to result in 
an organisation falling out of favour with decision-makers (Grant, 2000, p.128). 
These comments reflect the reality that even core insiders do not have free 
reign over policy decisions, and there may be times when groups need to attract 
media attention in order to get issues onto the agenda or to raise public support 
for their view on an AXisting issue. Use of the media in varying ways, and to 
varying degrees, is therefore an important strategic tool for pressun.~ groups 
with both insider and outsider status. 
To illustrate this point, and as previously discussed in Chapter 4, both 
WACOSS and TASWA use the media in their attempts to influence decision-
makers. Barron (personal communication, November 24, 2003) comments, 
"WACOSS places significant importance on use of the media". Due to the high 
profile of the organisation, and its role as a peak body, WACOSS' views are 
frequently cited in the press (WACOSS, 2002a, p.14). Purdy (personal 
communication, November 25, 2003; February 2, 2004) notes that when she 
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was employed by TASWA, media use, for the most part, was not a high priority 
strategy, although the organisation did engage in radio and newspaper 
interviews. The low priority placed on media use by TASWA may reflect the 
reality that the commercial media tends to ignore the views of more marginal 
groups and their attempts to publicise issues in which the causes of, and 
solutions to, the problem are complex. Homelessness is a prime example of 
such an issue (Tiffen, cited in Beresford, 2000, p.138). For both groups, the 
aim of lheir media strategies is to inform the public, promote debate about 
social issues, and to, at times, highlight government action or inaction with 
which the organisation agrees or disagrees (L. Barron, personal 
communication, November 24, 2003; J. Purdy, personal communication, 
November 25, 2003). 
Although TASWA did not have a history of its views being widely reported in the 
commercial media, use of the media was nonetheless an important strategy for 
T;1.SWA, via its association with the Housing the Homeless Coalition, during the 
Sh~~''\ Homelessness Taskforce. In this instance it was an effective tactic. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the West Australian approached the Coalition about its 
. 
views, and reported them in some detail in an article about the release of the 
Taskforce's Draft Report. WACOSS on the other hand did not run a media 
campaign during the Taskforce process, as it felt it could achieve its goals 
without resorting to this strategy (L. Barron, personal communication, November 
24, 2003). WACOSS did however distribute a media release at the completion 
of the process, ccngratulating the State Government on its response to the 
Taskforce's recommendations (WACOSS, 2002b). 
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Clearly, both insider and outsider status pressure grc"ps do use the media, 
however this is not adequotely r~ilected within the existing Australian literature, 
nor is it clarified by the Aberdeen model. Due to the range of different media 
activities that groups can utilise, (i.e. media releases, interviews, talk-oack 
radio, letters to the editor), and the varying aims of these tactics (i.e. to infonn 
the public, highlight government inaction, support a government action, be 
visible to its members), a clearer distinction between types of media use would 
be valuable. This would enable statements by pressure groups which support a 
government decision to be classified differently to those that are critical of 
government actions. 
Although the Aberdeen model does not illuminate use of the media by insider 
status groups, its terminology is useful: certain media activities could be classed 
as 'low-cost' actions, and others as 'high-cost' actions. Use of the media could 
therefore be differentiated between activities that fall within the realm of insider 
strategies, and those that would be classified as outsider strategies. To 
demonstrate, WACOSS' media release congratulating the State Government's 
response to the Taskforce's recommendations could be described as a low 
cost, insider strategy, which reinforces the group's relationship with the 
Government. The Alternative Taskforce, on the other hand, was openly hostile 
towards the formal Taskforce and actively sought to publicly express their view 
th"t the process was fiawed and was failing to address the real causes 
un.Jerlying homelessness (HTHC, 2001e). This type of media activity could be 
described as a high cost, outsider strategy." 
14 This is not to Imply that groups with insider status cannot or will not be publicly 
critical of government. As discussed in Chapter 2, decision makers recogniso that 
insider status groups will, at times, attempt to influence them via canvassing public 
support Barron (personal communication, December 2, 2003) comments that the way 
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Therefore, neither the existing understanding of insider and outsider groups in 
the Australian literature, nor the Aberdeen model, adequately explore the 
relationship between insider status groups and use of the media. However, 
both models offer elements which, when combined, enable media use by 
pressure groups to be categorised more succinctly: the existing model 
satisfactorily reflects the need for outsider status groups to continuously attempt 
to use the media in order to raise their profile and to gain public support on 
issues; and terminology within the Aberdeen model is useful in defining types of 
media use. 
In addition, the existing model implies that groups opt to use the media as a 
strategy when they feel on the 'outside' of core decision-making processes. 
This point continues to be of use when applying the Aberdeen model and 
attempting to determine why some insider status groups resort to high-cost 
media activities. Even insider status groups may not be invited into the inner 
sanctum on all issues, and may therefore feel outside the high-level 
consultation processes to which they are normally a party. Inside status groups 
may therefore feel the need, on such occasions, to aggressively use the media 
in order to publicise their points of view. 
In conclusion, this research has incorporated a case study approach to highlight 
the deficiencies of the existing model in the Australian literature, and to illustrate 
!he usefulness of the Aberdeen model in the study of pressure groups. The 
benefit of applying the Aberdeen model is that it enables a more specific 
government reacts to criticism depends upon its level of 'ma1iUrity' about the role of 
advocacy groups. 
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classification of pressure groups to be made, hence providing greater insights 
into the role and influence of pressure groups in the Australian policy process. 
In addition, the Aberdeen group's assertion that organisations are inhibited in 
their choice of strategy, and its explanation as to why this is the case, also 
prove to be useful analytical tools. It is important however to recognise that the 
Aberdeen model is not a 'cure-all'. Importantly though, it does at least 
recognise the complexities of the relationship.; between pressure groups, 
decision-makers, and policy processes, and is a vast improvement upon the 
understanding of insider and outsider groups which is currently dominates the 
Australian literature. 
The findings of this research indicate that the Aberdeen model is applicable in 
the Australian context. However, users of this model must remain mindfui that 
in Australia, it appears that ideological differences continue to play a role in the 
ascription of status to groups. The conducting of further case studies in an 
Australian setting, that explore the rival pressure group typologies, and the 
impact of irlaology upon status, would enable greater appreciation of these 
theoretical models and further develop the Australian pressure g;oup literature. 
A focus upon use of the media by both insider and outsider status groups may 
also be useful, as it would increase knowledge of the strategies used by 
pressure groups in their attempts to influence the policy process. 
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Appendix 1 - Interview Questions 
1. What were the main aims of the organisation going in to the 
Taskforce process? 
2. Was the organisation happy with the Taskforce process? 
3. Did the organisation feel that it achieved its goals and was 
successful? 
4. Were there any issues that the organisation fell were not adequately 
addressed by the Taskforce? 
5. Which strategies hos the organisation found to be the most 
successful in influencing decision·makers? 
6. Which strategies does the organisation believe were the most 
successful in influencing the outcomes of the Taskforce? 
7. How does the organisation decide upon strategy and policy? Does 
the membership have much influence over these decisions? 
8. Does the organisation have any comments to make on how 
responsibility for social problems such as homelessness are shared 
between the Federal and State Governments? Does this make it 
more difficult to have social issues addressed? 
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Appendix 2 - Pressure Group Survey 
1. Name of organisation? 
WACOSS 
2. How many staff are employed by the organisation? 
full-time 11 
part-time 3 
casual 
contract 
3. Are there other organisations that also represent the interests of your 
members? 
./ yes 
Cl no 
4. Does the organisation have to compete with these other groups for 
membership? 
./ yes 
Cl no 
5. Has or does the Gallop GovernmenVministers/members of parliament 
seek your assistance or advice on policy? 
./ yes 
Cl no 
If yes, indicate which of the following applies; 
./ general information 
./ pclicy alternatives/positions 
./ research 
./ other- representation on committees 
6. Did the Court GovernmenVministers/members of parliament seek your 
assistance or advkl'd On policy? 
./ yes 
Cl no 
If yes, indicate which of the following applied; 
./ general information 
./ policy olternatives/positions 
.0 research 
./ other- representation on committees. Bureaucrats did seek advice 
but not to the same level as under the Gallop Government. There 
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has been increased contact with Government since Labor was 
elected. 
7. What strategies do you employ in the attempt to influence policy 
decisions? 
./ representation on government committees/advisory boards 
./ submissions to committees/advisory boards etc 
./ consultation and negotiation w'.th government 
-1' publication of research 
./ formal contact with ministers/adviSors i.e. meetings 
./ informal contact with ministers/advisors i.e. phone calls, social events 
./ involvement with a policy network 
./ media 
./ media releases 
D letters to the editor 
0 use of talkpb~ck. radio 
0 advertising 
-1' other public actions 
[J protests 
./ public meetings 
[J letter and fax campaigns 
0 court action 
D campaigning for/against candidates at elections 
./ other- pre-election documents/forum 
8. Do the strategies you employ vary from issue to issue? 
-1' yes 
[J no 
9. Under the Gallop Government, how influential would you say your 
organisation has been upon policy in your area(s) of interest? 
[J very influential 
-1' quite influential 
D not very influential 
[J not influential at all 
10. Under the Court Government, how influential would you say your 
organisation was upon policy in your area(s) of interest? 
[J very influential 
[J quite influential 
./ not very influential- influential on some issues but not others 
[J not influential at all 
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11. Under the Gallop Government, which of the following categories (a-f) 
best describes your organisation? 
v" a) 
The organisation is able to influence policy. 
It is consulted with by government across a broad range of issues on 
a continual basis. 
The organisation is able to negotiate and bargain in its own area of 
expertise I in other policy areas as well (please indicate if either or 
bo!h). 
0 b) 
The organisation is able to influence policy. 
It is not involved across a broad range of issues. 
The organisation tends to focus on key, selected policy issues. 
Consultation with government is sporadic in nature rather than 
ongoing. 
The organisation is able to negotiate and bargain in own area of 
expertise only. 
0 c) 
The organisation's input into the consultation process is not seen as 
being integral by decisionwmakers. 
The organisation is seen as legitimate by decision-makers, but it is 
not very influential upon policy. 
D d) 
The organisation's involvement and influence in the policy process is 
largely cosmetic. 
D e) 
The organisation doesn't believe its aims can be reached via 
consultation with government. 
The organisation is often aiming for radical rather than incremental 
policy change. 
0 f) 
The organisation does not want to have, or be seen to have, a 
friendly relationship with government. 
Even though some of the organisation's goals may be attainable via 
bargaining and negotiation, it chooses not to do so. 
This is often in order to attracUkeep members. 
Bll 
12. Under the Court Government, which of the following categories (a-f) oest 
described your organisation? 
0 a) 
The organisation was able to influence policy. 
It was consulted with by government across a broad range of issues 
on a continual basis. 
The organisation was able to negotiate and bargain in its own area of 
expertise I in other policy areas as well (please indicate if either or 
both). 
"' b) 
The organisation was able to influence policy. 
It was not involved across a broad rarjge of issues. 
The organisation tended to focus on key, selected policy issues. 
Consultation with government was sporadic in nature rather than 
ongoing. 
The organisation was able to negotiate and bargain in own area of 
expertise only. 
0 c) 
The organisation's input into the consultation process was not seen 
as being integral by decision-makers. 
The organisation was seen as legitimate by decision-makers, but it 
was not very infiuential upon policy. 
0 d) 
The org~nisation's involvement and influence in the policy process 
was larg:.,ly cosmetic. 
0 e) 
The organisation didn't believe its aims could be reached via 
consultation with government. 
The organisation was often aiming for radical rather than incremental 
policy change. 
Of) 
The organisation did not want to have, or be seen to have, a friendly 
relationship with government. 
Even though some of the organisation's goals may have been 
attainable via bargaining and negotiation, it chose not to do so. 
This was often in order to attract/keep members. 
13. Additional comments? 
The organisation was able to influence policy under the Richard Court Liberal 
Government, however the influence Was limited to a few very specific areas. 
89 
Appendix 3 - Pressure Group Survey 
1. Name of organisation? 
TASWA 
2. How many staff are employed by the organisation? 
full-time 6 
part-time 5 
casual 2 
contract 
3. Are there other organisations that also represent the interests of your 
members? 
-1' yes 
D no 
4. Does the organisation have to compete with these other groups for 
membership? 
D yes 
·/ no 
5. Has or does the Gallop GovernmenUministers/members of parliament 
seek your assistance or advice on policy? 
D yes 
./ no- however, the organisation does provide advice relating to 
individual tenancy cases to electorate officers 
If yes, indicate which of the following applies; 
0 general information 
D policy alternatives/positions 
0 research 
./ other- representation on the Housing Advisory Committee 
6. Did the Court GovernmenUministers/members of parliament seek your 
assistance or advice on policy? 
D yes 
./ no - as above 
If yes, indicate which of the following applied; 
CJ oeneral information 
!J policy alternatives/positions 
D research 
D other ____________________ _ 
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7. What strategies do you employ in the attempt to influence policy 
decisions? 
v" representation on government committees/advisory boards 
./ submissions to committees/advisory boards etc 
./ ccnsultation and negotiation with government 
./ publication of research 
.; formal contact with ministers/advisors i.e. meetings 
0 informal contact with ministers/advisors i.e. phone calls, social events 
v involvement with a policy network 
v media 
../ media releases 
D letters to the editor 
v use of talk-back radio 
D advertising 
v other public actions 
v protests 
v public meetings 
v letter and fax campaigns 
./ court action 
D campaigning for/against candidates at elections 
D other __________________ _ 
8. Do the strategies you employ vary from issue to issue? 
v yes 
D no 
9. Under the Gallop Government, how influential would you say your 
organisation has been upon policy in your area(s) of interest? 
0 very influential 
0 quite influential 
v not very influential 
•:J not influential at all 
10. Under the Court Government, how influential would you say your 
organisation was upon policy in your area(s) of interest? 
D very influential 
D quite influential 
v not very influential 
D not influential at all 
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11. Under the Gallop Government. which of the following categories (a-f) 
best describes your organisation? 
Cl a) 
The organisation is able to influence policy. 
It is consulted with by government across a broad range of issues on 
a continual basis. 
The organisation is able to negotiate and bargain in its own area of 
expertise I in other policy areas as well (please indicate if either or 
both). 
Cl b) 
The organisation is able to influence policy. 
It is not involved across a broad range of issur-35. 
The organisation tends to focus on key, selected policy issues. 
Consultation with government is sporadic in nature rather than 
ongoing. 
The organisation is able to negotiate and b~rgain in own area of 
expertise only. 
v' c) 
The organisation's input into tt1e consultation process is not seen as 
being integral by decision·makers. 
The organisation is seen as legitimate by decision~makers, but it is 
not very influential upon policy. 
!J d) 
The organisation's involvement and influence in the policy process is 
largely cosmetic. 
Cl e) 
The organisation doesn't believe its aims can be reached via 
consultation with government. 
The organisation is often aiming for radical rather than incremental 
policy change. 
Cl f) 
The organisation does not want to have, or be seen to have, a 
friendly relationship with government. 
Even though some of the organisation's goals may be attainable via 
bargaining and negotiation, it chooses not to do so. 
This is often in order to attracUkeep members. 
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12. Under the Court Government, which of the following categories (a-f) best 
described your organisation? 
D a) 
The organisation was able to influence policy. 
li was consulted with by government across a broad range of issues 
on a continual basis. 
The organisation was able to negotiate and bargain in its own area of 
expertise I in other policy areas as well (please indicate if either or 
both). 
D b) 
The organisation was able to influence policy. 
It was not involved across a broad range of issues. 
The organisation tended to focus on key, selected policy issues. 
Consultation with government was sporadic in nature rather than 
ongoing. 
The organisation was able to negotiate and bargain in own area of 
expertise only. 
-1' c) 
The organisation's input into the consultation rrocess was not seen 
as being integral by decision-makers. 
The organisation was seen as legitimate by decision-makers, but it 
was not very influential upon policy. 
D d) 
The organisation's involvement and influence in the policy process 
was largely cosmetic. 
D e) 
The organisation didn't believe its aims could be reached via 
consultation with government. 
The organisation was often aiming for radical rather than incremental 
policy change. 
Of) 
The organisation did not want to have, or be se~n to have, a friendly 
relationship with government. 
Even though some of the organisation's goals may have been 
attainable via bargaining and negotiation, it chose not to do so. 
This was often in order to attract/keep members. 
13. Additional comments? 
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Appendix 4 - Case Study Database 
General documentation 
G1. Notes from the literature on pressure groups 
G2. Interview questions 
G3. Research proposal 
G4. Literature review on homelsssness 
State Homelessness Taskforce Documentation 
Some documents (") have been retrieved from files held at TASWA, being 
2.1.5: State Homelessness Strategy and 2.1.6 #1 and #2: Homelessness 
Taskforce. 
S1. Newsletter, Aug 2001 • 
S2. Draft background paper • 
53. Communication strategies 1st draft, with Purdy's comments'* 
54. Consultation strategies 2nd draft * 
S5. Introduction to Taskforce from websile 
S6. Background on Taskforce from websile 
S7. Draft Report (summary), Nov 2001 
SB. Draft Report (full rpt), Nov 2001 
S9. Final Report to Government, Jan 2002 - including issues paper, list of 
submissions and questions 
510. Strategies - communication, research & info gathering & consultation 
strategies, draft* 
S11. List of people/organisations contacted by Taskforce Secretariat Jui/Aug 
2001. 
S12. Media statement- Government Response to the Taskforce, 14/5/02 
S13 State Homelessness Taskforce Members Details • 
S14 Miller article in The West Australian, Re: homelessness in Western 
Australia, 22/03/01 
TA:SWA and Housing the Homeless Coalition Documentation 
Somt' documents (') have been retrieved from files held at TASWA, being 
2.1.5: State Homelessness Strategy and 2.1.6 #1 and #2: Homelessness 
Taskforce. 
T1. Purdy's notes on the SHTF Draft Issues Paper • 
T2. HTHC letter to involved organisations re: previous meetings & statement, 
16/11/01. 
T3. HTHC statemenl and letter sent to ministers, 16/11/01 • 
T4. Email from Purdy to The West Australian Re: HTHC response to the 
Draft Report, 27111/01 • 
T5. TAS comment on the Draft Report • 
T6. List of Alternative Taskforce members • 
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T7.' TASWA annual report 2000/01 
T8. TASWA annual report 2001/02 
T9. Purdy's paper A Danse Macabre 
T10. Email correspondence, 20/11/01 • 
T11. Email correspondence, 21/11/01 • 
T12. Letter from Geoff Gallop acknowledging receipt of HTHC Statement • 
T13. Letter from Joanne to Organisation B, Re: Homelessness Forum 
05/04/01 • 
T14. Letter from Purdy to Ministers, confinming TAS' acceptance of position on 
the SHTF, 13/07/01 • 
T15. Letter from Taskforce Chairperson to Purdy welc01ning her to the SHTF, 
12/07/01 • 
T16. Purdy's comments on Draft Background Paper 06/08/01 • 
T17. Emails between TASWA and Organisation B, Re: Taskforce's 
composition, 22-23/08/01 • 
T18. Article in The West Australian featuring the HTHC's response to the Draft 
Report, 28/11/01 
T19. Purdy's notes on the Taskforce Workshop on the 06/08/01, dated 
10/08/01 • 
T20. Letter from Sheila Mchale acknowledging receipt of HTHC Statement, 
27/12/01. 
T21. Letter from Tom Stephens acknowledging receipt of HTHC statement, 
27/12/01 • 
122. Emails between TASWA staff members, Re: SHTF Draft Report, 15-
15/12/01. 
T23. Email between TASWA and Organisation B, Re: Organisation B's Issues 
Paper, 07/12/01 • 
T24. Letter from Sheila McHale acknowledging Purdy's resignation, 23/10/01 • 
T25. Purdy's resignation letter, 02/09/01 • 
T26. Email from Purdy to Taskforce Members, Re: her resignation, 31/08/01 • 
T27. Letter from Purdy to Tom Stephens, Re: general homelessness issues, 
22/5/01 • 
T28. Personal communication with Purdy, no date 
T29. TASWA survey responses 
T30. Transcript of interview with Purdy 
T3·1. Personal communication with TASWA, Re: strategic plan, 24/11/03 
T32. NATO submission to the Productivity Commission Inquiry into First Home 
Ownership, Oct 2003. 
T33 TASWA strategic pizn, 2001/02 
T34 TASWA responsa to the SHTF Issues Paper • 
T35 Personal communication with Purdy, Re: identifying groups/individuals in 
the Alternative Taskforce, 11/11/03 
T36 Personal communication with Purdy, Re: TASWA and government 
funding and use of the media, 25/11/03, 2 & 3/12/03 
T37 Personal communication with TASWA, Re: members, 9,17 & 19/12/03 
T38 Personal communication with Purdy, Re: TASWA submission to the 
Issues Paper, 15/12/03 
T39 Personal communication with Purdy, Re: dissolving of the Alternative 
Taskforce, 5 & 6/01/04 
T40 O'Brien article from The Australian, Re: Indigenous Homelessness, 
24/11/01 
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T41 Boase article from The Aboriginal Independent, Re: Indigenous 
Homelessness, 24/02/01 
T42 Analysis of Purdy interview 
T43 Analysis of TASWA/HTHC strategies 
T44. Purdy's amendments to the draft thesis, 31/01/04 & 02/02/04 
T45 TASWA's amendments to the draft thesis, 01/02/04 
WACOSS Documentation 
Some documents (*) have been retrieved from files held at WACOSS, being 
H84-0064: Housing - State Homelessness Strategy and H84-0045: 
Homelessness- General. 
W1. 
W2. 
W3. 
W4. 
W5. 
W6. 
W7. 
we. 
W9. 
W10. 
W11. 
W12. 
W13. 
W14. 
W15. 
W16. 
W17. 
W18. 
W19. 
W20. 
W21. 
W22. 
W23. 
W24. 
W25. 
W26. 
1999/2000 pre-budget submission 
Pre-election submission to political parties, Dec 2000 
Letter from Boyle to Minister, Re: meeting with service providers, 
15/3/01 • 
Minutes of meeting between service providers and the Ministry for 
Housing, 16/3/01 • 
Fax from WACOSS to Peaks, Re: meeting, 27/3/01 • 
Outcomes of community sector meeting on short-term strategies, list 
given to Greg Joyce, 30/3/01 • 
Minister's response to letter from WACOSS (W3), 17/4/01 • 
Report on the progress of community sector meetings on homelessness 
-short tern' and long term, 2/5/01 • 
Fax to Non-Government Working Party, Re: to clarify what should be in 
the strategy, 2/5/01 • 
Fax to Non-Government Working Party, Re: meeting for 10/5/01, 
outcomes of 2/5/0t attached • 
Minutes of homelessness strategy meeting at the Ministry of Housing, 
3/5/01 • 
Draft outcomes of the Long-Term Working Strategies group for meetings 
2 & 10/5/01 -to be ratified at meeting on 29/5/01 • 
Submission to the Minister on the state homeleosness strategy by the 
Working Group, 6/6/01 • 
Emails between the WACOSS President and Executive Director, Re: 
Non-Government Working Party wanting to offer up names for the 
taskforce, 22/6/01 • 
Letter from Minister to Taskforce Chairperson, Re: his appt, terms of 
reference* 
Notes on Shelter Homelessness Forum 19/9/01 
WACOSS submission to the Issues Paper • 
Summary notes from Shelter Homelessness Forum, 12/12/01 
WACOSS submission to the Draft Report, 12/01 • 
Pre-budget submission 2002/03 
Pre-budget submission 2003/04-
Notes from informal chat with Barron, 26/3/03 
Social policy unit info from web 
Annual report 2001/02 
Annual report 2000/01 
Minutes from homelessness strategy meeting, Ministry of Housing, 
18/5/00. 
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W27. Survey 
W28. Meeting of the Short-Term Working Group 11/5/01 • 
W29. Letter from Organisation A to WACOSS proposing that they work 
together • 
W30. WACOSS response to the Government response to the Taskforce 
09/05/02. 
W31. City of Perth homelessness seminar* 
W32. Transcript of Barron interview 
W33. Notification of Homelessness Strategy meeting, from the Ministry oi' 
Housing, 14/3/01 
W34. Analysis of Barron interview 
W35. Analysis ofWACOSS strategies 
W36. Personal communication with Barron, Re: use of the media by WACOSS, 
24/11/03 
W37. Personal communication with Barron, Re: government funding, 02/12/03 
W38. Barron's amendments to the draft thesis, 20/01/04 
W39. Article in the West Australian about the WACOSS Australians Living on 
the Edge Report, 9/11/01 
W40. WACOSS' amendments to the draft thesis, 30/01/04 
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Informed Consent Form for Organisations 
Project Title: Pressure groups and tile State Homelessness Taskforce: An 
investigation of the insider/outsider model of pressure group theory. 
I, Me- &W the Executive Officer of ~vl"rCO I>, have 
read the attached Statement of Disclosure and any questions about the aims 
and purposes of this study have been answered to my satisfaction. 
The organisation agrees to participate in this activity and understands that it 
may wilhdraw consent at any time. 
The organisation acknowledges that participation will involve allowing Ms Blake 
access to documentation relating to its role in the State Homelessness 
Taskforce, the completion of a survey, and an interview of a former or current 
staff member. 
The organisation acknowledges that the research will be publicly available and 
that parts of the research may be subsequently published. The organisation 
also understands that it will be identified. Individuals within the organisation will 
not be identified without their informed consent. 
Ms Blake agrees to provide a copy of her report to this organisation upon its 
completion. 
Informed Consent Form for Organisations 
Project Title; Pressure groups and the State Homelessness Taskforce; An 
investigation of the insider/outsider model of pressure group theory. 
I,·. :JQ_ f...>-c- the Executiv~ Otficer o~JU,~ 
read the ched Statement of Disclosure and any questions about the aims 
and purposes of this study have been answered to my satisfaction. 
The organisation agrees to participate in this activity and understands that it 
may withdraw consent at any time. 
The organisation acknowledges that participation will involve allowing Ms Blake 
access to documentation relating to its role in the State Homelessness 
Taskforce, the completion of a survey, and an inteJview of a former or current 
staff member. 
The organisation aclmowledges that the research will be publicly available and 
that parts of the research may be subsequently published. The organisation 
also understands that it will be identified. Individuals within the organisation will 
not be identified without their informed consent. 
Ms Blaka agrees to provide a copy of her report to this organisation upon its 
completion. 
Participant: Date: z.,( tuF 
Investigator Date: \"' · 8. ·"' ~ 
Informed Consent Form for Individuals 
Project Title: Pressure groups and the State Homelessness Taskforce: An 
investigation of the insider/outsider model of pressure group theory. 
1. tf-4-J.irlf ~ · , have read the attached Statement of Disclosure 
and any questions about the aims and purposes of this study have been 
answered to my satisfaction. 
I agree to participate in this project, and understand that I may withdraw at any 
time. 
I acknowledge that the research will be publicly available and that parts of the 
research may subsequently be published. I also understand that I may be 
identified. 
I understand that I will be interviewed and that the interview will be audio 
recorded. I also understand that the recording will be erased once the interview 
is transcribed, and that I will be provided will a copy of the interview transcript to 
vet. 
Participant: 
Investigator: Date: 22... • c,· o '1 
Informed Consent Form for Individuals 
Project Title: Pressure groups and the State Homelessness Taskforce: An 
investigation of the insider/outsider model of pressure group theory. 
I, 'J'"o<ANtH"'S· PU<tll'1 , have read the attached Statement of Disclosure 
and any questions about the aims and purposes of this study have been 
answered to my satisfaction. 
I agree to participate in this project, and understand that I may withdraw at any 
time. 
I acknowledge that the research will be publicly available and that parts of the 
research may subsequently be published. 'l 'A-L.» ~~"""""' '"T.I'M'(" qp 
-±. ww., 6<. \\le<"<"'""'el>. I l~J!!Ol 
I understand that I will be interviewed and that the interview will be audio 
recorded. I also understand that the recording will be erased once th<:J interview 
is transcribed, and that I will be provided will a copy of the interview transcript to 
vet. 
Participant: 
Investigator: 
Date: 'Of 9 (o 3 
Date: IS· "'·<=> s 
